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Looking Backward, Looking Forward:
Puerto Ricans in the Quest for the New York City Mayoralty
by RichARd KENdALL
This paper examines the history of Puerto 
Rican efforts to win the mayoralty of the 
city of New York, highlighting the 2005 
election. By doing so, it seeks to fill a gap 
in the history of Puerto Rican political 
participation in New York. The struggle 
of Puerto Rican elites to win representa-
tion at the highest level of office in the 
city is long-standing. The paper chronicles 
the circumstances and terms according to 
which they sought political incorporation 
at that level. 
A full survey of the history of efforts by 
political leaders to secure the nomination 
and obtain the mayoralty would include a 
detailed narrative and analysis of the role 
of party organizations, labor unions, commu-
nity groups, and voter behavior over time. 
While this paper offers some references 
to the larger context in which Puerto Rican 
political elites carried out their efforts, 
such account is beyond its scope. The 
paper looks critically at the issue of runoff 
elections. The role of money is examined 
through the lens of the 2005 election. The 
results of the 2005 vote are also included. 
The paper concludes with a reflection 
on the prospects for Puerto Rican (Latino 
or minority) political representation at 
the mayoral level in New York. 
The experience of Puerto Ricans in New 
York deserves more detailed scrutiny. Their 
case is interesting because it provides 
insights that help us understand the 
process of political incorporation of 
minority elites. A modern polity cannot 
be fully democratic if the door to political 
power is permanently closed to any  
one group or segment of society. 
Therefore, for the sake of urban  
democracy, we need to know whether  
the Puerto Rican experience reflects 
structural or contingent difficulties. 
Efforts to develop insights for the future 
from historical experience are not without 
pitfalls.1 Because nothing remains the 
same, solutions that worked in the past 
may not work in the present. The solu-
tions we identify may be misleading if 
the past is inaccurately represented. We 
can find lessons in history but we must 
be self-conscious about their limitations. 
History can be a guide for action so long 
as we recognize that before action historical 
knowledge is rarely, if ever, tried and true.
SEEKiNg thE NomiNAtioN,  
1969-2001
Puerto Ricans have been present in New 
York City since the nineteenth century. 
As early as 1937, the community obtained 
political representation with the election 
of Oscar García Rivera, of Manhattan, to 
the state assembly. At the time, Puerto 
Rican colonies were scattered throughout 
the city and their numbers were not as 
1 See José E. Cruz, “Pushing Left to Get to the Center, Puerto 
Rican Radicalism in Hartford, Connecticut,” In Andrés Torres and 
José E. Vélazquez, eds,. The Puerto Rican Movement, Voices from 
the Diaspora (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998), pp. 69-87.
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significant as during the post-World War II period. In 1953, 
thirteen years after García Rivera’s stint in Albany ended, Felipe 
N. Torres was elected to the assembly; he served until 1962.
Around the end of Torres’ incumbency, Puerto Ricans in New 
York began to engage in a different style of political action. 
The period from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s was 
marked by sporadic instances of collective behavior as well as 
by a radical ferment. During this stage, Puerto Ricans were 
protagonists of one of the worst civil disturbances the city had 
ever seen and the first large-scale rebellion in their New York 
history, the Harlem Riot of 1967. Activists also organized the 
Young Lords Party (YLP), the Puerto Rican Socialist Party 
(PSP), El Comité-MINP (Movimiento de Izquierda Nacional 
Puertorriqueño), and the Puerto Rican Student Union (PRSU). 
These groups tried, unsuccessfully, to bridge mainland and 
homeland politics, using local issues to rally Puerto Ricans 
behind the cause of independence for Puerto Rico. At the 
same time, mainstream Puerto Rican politicians focused their 
efforts on bureaucratic political incorporation, sidestepping 
the national question. Nevertheless, they used national identity 
to incite political participation locally. Puerto Rican leaders 
were active in the Community Action Program (CAP) agencies 
and anti-poverty programs of the time. They developed their 
own anti-poverty agencies, participated in the social movements 
of the time, and ran for office locally and statewide. During the 
Wagner and Lindsay administrations a number of Puerto Rican 
elites became influential as participants in electoral campaigns, 
as advisors to the mayor, and through appointment or election 
to positions of responsibility and power. Access to power  
during that period was the prologue of interventions focused 
on the mayoralty. In 1969, Puerto Rican Herman Badillo 
sought the city’s mayoral office for the first time.
StRiKE oNE
In 1960, columnist Babby Quintero wrote: “New York is 
becoming more and more Hispanic by the day but “El Barrio” 
has been dismembered. (…) There is no place in Manhattan, 
the Bronx, and Brooklyn without Hispanic residents, the 
majority being Puerto Rican. We fancy that a Puerto Rican 
mayor is not that far off in the future.”2 Nine years later, the 
2 Babby Quintero, “En Nueva York y en Todas Partes, El Diario de Nueva York, November 2, 1960, p. 6.
history of Puerto Rican efforts to control the mayor’s office 
began with the candidacy of Herman Badillo. 
Badillo got his start in New York City politics as a stalwart of 
the Kennedy campaign for the presidency. Through the John F. 
Kennedy political club he became head of the campaign in East 
Harlem in 1960. His involvement was prompted by the need to 
register Hispanics and blacks. When he approached the Italian 
leadership of the Democratic party with his registration proposal 
they were simply shocked. According to Badillo, no one had 
ever thought of registering blacks and Hispanics even though 
they were at the time the predominant population in the Bronx. 
As soon as Badillo began his registration work, he had to contend 
with the resistance of the party organization headed by Congress-
man Alfred Santangelo. “You can’t believe all the garbage that’s 
being registered,” one of Santangelo’s workers told him, refer-
ring to Puerto Ricans and blacks. This worker did not know that 
Badillo was Puerto Rican; he didn’t even know who Badillo 
was, because Badillo could pass for Italian. So the worker said: 
“We got to stop them. The school is supposed to close at 
10:30 pm but I’m going to close it at 9:00 pm.” Badillo faked 
agreement and then proceeded to plant himself in front of the 
school at 9:00 pm to wait for voters to come to register. As they 
turned away he took their names and then filed a lawsuit on 
their behalf against the Board of Elections for discrimination. 
He tried and won the lawsuit. This was “the first time in the 
history of New York City that it was proven that the Board of 
Elections and the regular [party] organization discriminated 
against Hispanics and blacks.” According to Badillo, his regis-
tration effort and the lawsuit had two major consequences: 
East Harlem had the largest increase in new registered voters 
in the 1960 election and he became known politically.3 
In January 1969, during the course of an interview at City 
Hall, Badillo, then Bronx Borough president, was asked if he 
planned to run for mayor. He offered a curious response: 
“Many think that all Puerto Ricans are short, colored, and 
unable to speak English. If I run I will go everywhere in the 
city so that everyone can see that I am tall, proficient in 
3 Herman Badillo Interview, August 10, 2006 by José E. Cruz.
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English, a certified public accountant, and a lawyer.”4 Perhaps 
for the sake of prudence, he did not say that he also wanted 
people to see that he was white. The subtext was nevertheless 
there, in the use of the word “colored”: he was a viable candi-
date because he was qualified and also because he could pass.
Badillo needed to win a party primary scheduled for June 17. 
In a statement released at the Overseas Press Club on April 2, 
he specified his qualifications and declared his intention to 
meet the fiscal, administrative, and political challenges facing 
the city. His emphasis was on making the city livable. “Sure 
New York is falling apart,” reads one of his campaign flyers, 
“but Badillo can put it back together.” Badillo’s solution to the 
imbalance between annual increases in spending of 15 percent 
compared to annual revenue increases of only 4 percent was 
simple: “We will have that deficit regardless of who is mayor 
and regardless of what promises are made unless income is 
increased or expenses are reduced.” Reacting to the climate of 
racial and ethnic hostility that enveloped the city he declared: 
“There has been an increase in crime and there are some who 
believe that the Blacks and the Puerto Ricans are the only 
criminals...There are slums in this city and there are some who 
look at the people who live in them and blame them for their 
existence. The fact is that most of the slums in our city were 
created prior to 1900—before those groups who reside in them 
now migrated to New York City.”5 Badillo continued to forge 
ahead and in May, with Frank Espada, chairman of ASPIRA 
and vice president of the Urban Coalition, he joined a group 
of black leaders to form Black Independent Voters, to endorse 
candidates and to unify the city’s black and Puerto Rican vote.6
As the mayoral primary neared, Badillo’s prospects became 
dimmer. By June 12, Robert Wagner had a slight edge over 
him according to a poll conducted by the newspaper Town and 
Village. Yet the cumulative results of two weeks of polling put 
4 “Herman Badillo Hará Campaña en la Calle,” El Diario-La Prensa, January 13, 1969, p. 13. In 
1965, shortly after his election as Bronx Borough President, Badillo was asked if he intended to run for 
mayor. His reply was: “People are also mentioning Lindsay’s name as a presidential candidate. I think 
we are only interested in working hard during the next four years in our new posts.”  See “Junta de 
Elecciones Declara Ganador a Herman Badillo,” El Diario-La Prensa, November 9, 1965, p. 3.
5 Herman Badillo Primary Campaign Flyer; Statement of Bronx Borough President Herman Badillo 
made at Overseas Press Club, April 2, 1969. Jesús Colón Papers, New York Organizations, Box 
1, Folder 5. Center for Puerto Rican Studies Archives, Hunter College, City University of New York. 
Hereinafter referred to as Centro Archives.
6 “Negro Unit Seeks Power Of Ballot,” New York Times, May 11, 1969, p. 37. In February, Frank 
Espada was identified in a New York Times report as executive director of the Urban Coalition.
Badillo ahead of Wagner by three points.7 Described by the 
press as “the liberal Democratic president of the Bronx,” 
Badillo’s campaign focused on service delivery issues. So did 
Wagner’s. Meanwhile, the conservative wing of the Republican 
Party attacked Mayor John Lindsay for being soft on crime. 
The call of conservatives for law and order was expected to 
resonate among what they called “the Democratic Irish and 
Italians and others who don’t like Negro lovers.”8 
By mid-July, Lindsay had enough support to secure his re-election 
bid and Badillo’s candidacy was over. In the primary Badillo received 
almost 90 percent of the Puerto Rican vote, over half of the black 
vote, and over 20 percent of the Jewish vote. But this was not 
enough. Mario Procaccino won the Democratic nomination with 
less than a third of the ballots and Badillo lost, not so much 
because of Norman Mailer’s campaign, as he claimed in 2006, 
but because of the support that Wagner took away from him 
from Jewish voters.9 The multiple expressions of support for 
Badillo, including a plea from Puerto Rico’s ex-governor Luis 
Muñoz Marín for Puerto Ricans to register and vote for him, 
did not translate into the votes needed to win.10 A voter registration 
drive that was promised by Puerto Rican activist Gilberto Gerena 
Valentín—who had just been fired from his post on the Commis-
sion on Human Rights—was actually led by H. Carl McCall 
and Frank Espada. While over 60,000 new voters were added 
to the rolls, the campaign was considered a failure. The large 
number of blacks and Puerto Ricans expected to register did not 
materialize and there were charges of apathy, indifference, and 
even subversion of the effort on the part of the political parties. 
Blacks and Puerto Ricans were allegedly discouraged from register-
ing by inspectors doing the bidding of local party leaders. As a 
result, McCall and Espada called for the abolition of the Elections 
Board and for the placing of federal supervisors in districts 
where less than 50 percent of the voters were registered.11 
7 Lindsay, Wagner Win in Final Poll, June 12, 1969. John V. Lindsay Papers, Subject Files 1966-
1973, Box 90 Folder 1676, Municipal Archives, New York City.
8 Law and Order is the Issue in New York City Campaign, June 12, 1969. John V. Lindsay Papers, 
Subject Files 1966-1973, Box 90 Folder 1676, Municipal Archives, New York City.
9 Chris McNickle, To be Mayor of New York (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 226-
228. In the 2006 interview, Badillo referred to Norman Mailer’s candidacy for the mayoral nomination 
as a “drunken campaign.” Badillo noted that he lost by less than the amount of votes accrued by 
Mailer and inferred that those votes would have gone to him if Mailer had not participated.
10 Muñoz’s open letter in support of Badillo was published in Luisa Quintero’s “Marginalia” column in 
El Diario-La Prensa, on June 9, 1969, p. 16.
11 “Badillo Rejects A Mayoral Race; May Back Lindsay,” New York Times, July 15, 1969, p. 1; 
Richard Reeves, “Democratic Group Endorses Lindsay At Unruly Session,” New York Times, July 
17, 1969, p. 1; “The Anti-Registration Drive,” New York Times, August 25, 1969, p. 34; Peter Kihss, 
“Special Drive for Registration Fails to Draw Minority Voters,” New York Times, August 26, 1969, p. 33; 
“Civic Body Scores Voter Drive Here,” New York Times, September 5, 1969, p. 35.
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Badillo’s aborted bid for the mayoralty was compounded by 
the loss in the November election of his post as Bronx borough 
president to Robert Abrams. On November 19, the Misión 
Vito Marcantonio of the Movimiento Pro Independencia, a 
Puerto Rican nationalist group seeking to end colonialism in 
Puerto Rico, issued a public statement declaring that Puerto 
Ricans should be working in unity with blacks against oppor-
tunistic politicians and professionals such as Herman Badillo. 
“That rotten leadership,” reads the statement, “deserves only 
our repudiation.”12 This appraisal is worth highlighting 
because, at best, it suggests that one segment of the political 
leadership of the community did nothing to help Badillo when 
he needed all the support he could get.
The climate of opinion in 1969 was also not favorable to 
Badillo. Not only was racial polarization in the city intense 
but, in addition, the Lindsay administration was perceived as 
racially biased in favor of minorities. White New Yorkers did 
not feel represented at City Hall.13 If they felt abandoned by a 
white mayor, what were the chances they would think that a 
Puerto Rican candidate would be any different? Further, 
minority voters felt adequately represented by Lindsay. In that 
case, there was no strong reason for them to support Badillo.
StRiKE two
The next time a Puerto Rican sought the Democratic Party’s 
nomination for mayor was in 1973. Once again, the aspirant 
was Herman Badillo. He faced Ed Koch, Robert Postel, a city 
councilman, Jerome Kretchner, and assemblyman from the 
Upper West Side, and Albert Blumenthal, also an assemblyman 
and deputy minority leader of the State Assembly. The key to 
the nomination was the endorsement of the liberal group, the 
New Democratic Coalition (NDC). Badillo assumed he had it 
and Blumenthal worked for it. Badillo lost the endorsement 
and in a fit of rage accused the NDC of racism.14 
This time, a critical element of the context was the court man-
date, issued on March 22, ordering the use of bilingual ballots 
and interpreters at the polls in community school board elec-
12 Movimiento Pro Independencia, Misión Vito Marcantonio, Declaración de Prensa, November 19, 
1969. Jesús Colón Papers, New York Organizations, Box 1, Folder 4. Centro Archives. Citation trans-
lated from the Spanish by José E. Cruz.
13 McNickle, pp. 216-218.
14 Ibid., pp. 243-244.
tions. This was the result of Lopez v. Dinkins (1973), a lawsuit 
filed by the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund 
(PRLDEF) with Community Action for Legal Services and 
the New York Civil Liberties Union. In September, building 
upon the March decision, PRLDEF scored another victory 
when a federal district judge ruled on a suit filed by the group, 
ordering the city’s elections board to provide bilingual voting 
instructions and translators for the November election at all 
polling places in districts where 5 percent or more of the resi-
dents spoke Spanish.15 
This was a condition favorable to Badillo but he was unable to 
take advantage of the provision. His inability to win the 
endorsement of the NDC, of the regular party organization, 
and later the primary against Abraham Beame was due to sev-
eral factors: a series of credentials challenges that eroded his 
base of support, his failure to win over non-Puerto Ricans and 
conservatives, his public “spasm of rage” when things did not 
go his way, and his rigidity and arrogance. Beame was strong 
because in the eyes of voters he had the most governmental 
experience. He was also the favorite of the party regulars, who 
trusted him as one of their own. Badillo, in contrast, could not 
even get the support of the black elite. Percy Sutton, Charles 
Rangel, and Basil Paterson felt the wind blowing in the direc-
tion of Beame and with him they went.16 
Badillo’s ethnicity was also considered a factor of his defeat.17 
Yet, if ethnicity was an obstacle, what could explain the elec-
tion of Ramón Vélez from the Bronx’s 11th district, and Luis 
Olmedo from Brooklyn’s 27th to the city council? The answer 
was simple: in districts configured with large Puerto Rican 
concentrations, Puerto Ricans won. Citywide, partisan politics, 
legal requirements, personality features, and racial polarization 
combined to make success impossible.18 But racial polarization 
was part of the context rather than a decisive factor. Badillo 
acted arrogantly and brashly; the rejection by voters of Mario 
15 Murray Illson, “Judge Orders City to Run Bilingual Elections Nov. 6,” New York Times, September 
28, 1973, p. 1.
16 McNickle, pp. 245-246.
17 Frank Lynn, “Blumenthal Tops Badillo For Coalition’s Backing,” New York Times, March 4, 1973, 
p. 1; Frank Lynn, “Badillo Urged by Abrams To Give Up Mayoral Race,” New York Times, March 6, 
1973, p. 33; Frank Lynn, “He’s Out; Who’s In?” New York Times, March 11, 1973, section 4, p. 1; 
Tomn Buckley, “Badillo: Mayoral Hopeful Dogged by Problems,” New York Times, April 2, 1973, p. 37; 
Frank Lynn, “A Minority Candidacy Is Rejected,” New York Times, July 1, 1973, section 4, p. 3.
18 Murray Schumach, “Council Creates 6 Districts for City Groups,” New York Times, December 23, 
1972, p. 1.
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Procaccino in favor of Lindsay in 1969 demonstrated that 
arrogance and vitriol was unacceptable regardless of ethnicity. 
Further, Badillo was weak citywide, not so much because he 
was Puerto Rican but because he was perceived to be, truly or 
not, simply a Puerto Rican/minority candidate.19 To be sure, 
both the New York Times and the New York Post endorsed 
Badillo as the best hope for the city as a whole. At the same 
time, Italian and Irish voters were disinclined to support him 
because he was Puerto Rican. But Badillo could have won if 
only he had persuaded a sufficient number of Jewish voters 
that he was a better choice than Beame. Beame was the party 
regular and Badillo was not and party support was critical in 
the mobilization of voters. Racism was present during the 
campaign but it did not determine the outcome.20 
StRiKE thREE
Badillo tried to win the nomination for mayor a third time in 
1977. In February he was only considering a run. Bella Abzug 
and Edward Koch were also thinking about seeking the  
mayoralty. In March, the Democratic National Committee 
discounted the possibility of either Badillo or Koch being  
successful. The committee declared that incumbent Abraham 
Beame had the best chance of winning a primary. By April, the 
scuttlebutt on Badillo was that without an endorsement from 
the Liberal Party he would not run. Koch described him as far 
behind the pack. In May, Badillo saw his chances diminished 
by the entrance into the race of Abzug. He blasted her in  
public for not honoring a promise to back him. According to 
Badillo, Abzug had offered her support in exchange for his 
endorsement of her U.S. senate candidacy in 1976. Against all 
odds, in June he decided to enter the primary. He felt confident 
in his ability to defeat Beame in a runoff. 
At the same time, Manhattan Borough President Percy Sutton 
began campaigning for the Democratic nomination, with  
support from black leaders David Dinkins and Charles 
Rangel. This was a move that could only diminish black  
support for Badillo. Badillo was certain that support for him 
among blacks would erode only in Manhattan. This belief was 
shattered when more than a dozen black mayors as well as 
19 McNickle, p. 247.
20 Ibid., pp. 250-252.
black elected officials from across the country rallied behind 
Percy Sutton. In August, sociologist Herbert Gans declared 
Badillo the most competent candidate of all. WCBS-Radio 
endorsed Badillo but WCBS-TV endorsed Mario Cuomo, 
who had entered the race as Governor Carey’s preferred  
candidate. Badillo was also given a “preferred” rating by the 
New York Political Action Council, a newly formed, nonpartisan 
organization of gays and lesbians. A key challenge for Badillo 
was persuading voters that he was concerned with the interests 
of all New Yorkers rather than just Puerto Ricans. But in this 
he was not alone. The race as a whole was perceived as an ethnic 
contest between Italians, represented by Cuomo, blacks,  
represented by Sutton, and Jews, represented by Abzug, Koch, 
and Beame. There was even a candidate that was considered 
representative of the business class, Joel Harnett, but he was 
really nobody’s candidate.21 
Badillo came in sixth place in the primary with just 11 percent 
of the vote. Koch and Cuomo came in first and second respec-
tively and had to fight for the nomination in a runoff.22 Badillo 
decided to support Koch. Koch went on to win the nomination 
and then the election, with more support from blacks and Puerto 
Ricans than Cuomo, who ran on the Liberal Party line.23 
StRiKE FouR?
When Koch ran for re-election in 1981, there was a challenger 
from the Hispanic community but his candidacy was so  
marginal that anyone other than a historian looking backward 
could easily miss it. It was not Herman Badillo, although he 
did consider running. In 1978, Koch made Badillo a Deputy 
Mayor and by 1979 Badillo was out. Now he was down and 
out and therefore did not pursue the position. The challenger 
was Dr. Jerónimo Domínguez, who also ran for Bronx  
borough president in 1979 on the Right to Life Party line. 
During a debate with Koch he told the audience: “Everyone 
must vote. If you don’t vote you cannot complain.” He  
promised to end crime and drug abuse, to rebuild the  
subway system, to maintain the city’s infrastructure, and to 
rehabilitate the more than 10,000 buildings that had been 
21 Ibid., pp. 260-261.
22 Ibid., p. 267.
23 Ibid., p. 269.
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abandoned during the four years of Koch’s administration. 
Domínguez also ran on a platform of higher taxes for the rich 
and the promise of a crackdown on absentee landlords. “If you 
are rich or a landlord, then vote for Koch,” said Domínguez, 
“because I am declaring war on rich people.”24 Councilman 
Luis Olmedo, who was neither rich nor a landlord, exhorted 
all Hispanics to re-elect Koch. In his view, Koch had done a 
great job. Olmedo disputed the notion that Koch was hostile 
to minorities in the city. Further, Olmedo claimed that Koch’s 
victory was inevitable and that voting for someone else would 
be a wasted vote.25 Koch won by a landslide, running on the 
Democratic and Republican party line.
LA tERcERA (No) ES LA VENcidA  
(thREE StRiKES ANd You’RE [Not] out)
In 1984, Latinos were starkly divided in their attitude toward 
Koch. Those opposing him were 54 percent of the total com-
pared to 46 percent who were supportive.26 According to a 
1984 poll, had Herman Badillo run against Koch in that year, 
he would have lost the Latino vote 38 to 46 percent.27 The 
rejection of Badillo by Latinos suggested that, in his case, as 
the Spanish saying goes, “La tercera es la vencida” [Three strikes 
and you’re out]. In Hispanic culture, just as in baseball, you 
have three chances to make it; after that you are done. But in 
American politics, one failed candidacy is often enough to finish 
a politician’s career for good. By running for a fourth time, 
Badillo went against the conventional wisdom and then some. 
In January 1985, Badillo declared that he would run for the 
mayoralty. He made his participation conditional on garnering 
support from a broad-based coalition.28 His announcement 
was immediately followed by a blanket rejection from Stanley 
Hill, deputy executive director of District Council 37 of the 
State, County, and Municipal Employees Union. District 37 
was key to developing an anti-Koch coalition, and Hill’s rejection 
24 “Si usted no vota luego no se queje, dice Domínguez,” El Diario-La Prensa, November 2, 1981, 
p. 7. It is not certain that Domínguez was Puerto Rican.
25 Manuel de Dios Unanue, “Concejal Olmedo: que todos voten mañana,” El Diario-La Prensa, 
November 2, 1981, p. 7.
26 New York City Chapter’s Approach to Electoral Question, n.d., p. 2. Lourdes Torres Papers, 
Series IV National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Box 4 Folder 4, Centro Archives.
27 Institute for Puerto Rican Policy, “The 1985 Mayoral Race and the Puerto Rican-Latino 
Community in New York City,” December 1984, p. 4. Lourdes Torres Papers, Series IV National 
Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, Box 4 Folder 4, Centro Archives.
28 Susan Heller Anderson and David W. Dunlap, “Who Will Finally Decide to Run Against Mayor 
Koch?,” New York Times, January 5, 1985, p. 24.
of Badillo was a severe blow to his candidacy, an emblem of 
Badillo’s weak standing with African-American elites.29 
A week after Hill’s statement, the New York Times published 
the results of a poll of 1,329 adults conducted between January 
5 and 10. A majority of repondents, 53 percent, thought that 
Koch deserved re-election. Among whites, support for Koch’s 
re-election was 65 percent. Only 31 percent of blacks supported 
his re-election compared to 49 percent of Hispanics. Support 
for Badillo was only 34 percent. He was viewed most favorably 
by Hispanics, but even among them only a minority of 45 
percent had a favorable view of his candidacy; only 33 percent 
of blacks shared the feeling.30 Poll results notwithstanding, 
black leaders invited Badillo to be interviewed as a potential 
candidate at a meeting to be held on January 26. According to 
Assemblyman Al Vann, a group of black leaders, union officials, 
and liberal Democrats would interview up to eight candidates 
and then announce an endorsement.31 
Despite the Spanish saying and the evidence from the polls, if 
Badillo ever had a good chance of securing the Democratic 
nomination for mayor, it was in 1985. A coalition of Hispanic 
leaders supported his candidacy. At the end of January, after the 
Coalition for A Just New York completed the process of inter-
viewing candidates, he and Carol Bellamy appeared to be the two 
hopefuls with the strongest support among black politicians.32 
Yet, after heated deliberations within the Coalition, support 
for Badillo was split. Under such circumstances, the Coalition 
endorsed Assemblyman Herman “Denny” Farrell, Jr. True to 
his word that he would not run without coalition support, 
Badillo dropped out. “I can understand there will be disap-
pointment by those who expected that Mr. Badillo would be 
our candidate,” Al Vann said.33 Indeed, Farrell’s last-minute 
entry into the race caused widespread resentment among 
Hispanics. The unhappiness of Hispanic Democrats was so 
29 Frank Lynn, “Koch Foes Discussing Blacks for Council President,” New York Times, January 12, 
1985, p. 25.
30 “Poll Favors Koch for 3d Term but City Services Rate Poorly,” New York Times, January 17, 1985, 
p. 1.
31 Frank Lynn, “Koch Agrees to Meeting With Blacks at City Hall,” New York Times, January 18, 
1985, p. B4.
32 Frank Lynn, “6 Mayoral Contenders Give Views to Black Group,” New York Times, January 27, 
1985, p. 18; Susan Heller Anderson and David W. Dunlap, “New York Day by Day; Coalition Time,” 
New York Times, January 30, 1985, p. B5.
33 Frank Lynn, “Bellamy Enters Race for Mayor; Black Coalition Endorses Farrell,” New York Times, 
February 9, 1985, p. 1.
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great that some even demanded the dissolution of the Black and 
Puerto Rican Caucus in Albany.34 On November 5, Koch was 
reelected to serve a third term with over 80 percent of the vote.
NExt mAN At bAt
After the 1985 debacle, Badillo’s successor in Congress, Robert 
García, considered running for mayor. His plan to run focus 
groups to gauge the willingness of nonHispanics to vote for a 
Puerto Rican was thwarted by the explosion of the Wedtech 
scandal, a case of corruption, extortion, and bribery involving 
federal funds, which terminated his political career.35 Thus, no 
Puerto Rican pursued the mayor’s office until 1997 when 
Bronx Borough President Fernando Ferrer stepped up to the 
mayoral plate for the first time. Ferrer began his involvement 
in politics as a student activist. His Wikipedia biography notes 
that “in 1968, as an Aspirante, he was part of a major student 
protest at the NYC Board of Education that resulted in such 
reforms as bilingual report cards and the recognition by the 
public schools of Puerto Rican Discovery Day (November 
19th).”36 It should be no surprise to anyone that the impact of 
this demonstration, whose specific demands were more courses 
on Puerto Rican culture and history and proportional repre-
sentation of Puerto Ricans in the Board’s decentralization 
plan,37 is greatly exaggerated in the Wikipedia profile. Be that 
as it may, the event marked the early political activism of Ferrer.
Ferrer entered politics as a candidate for office in 1974 by 
running against Assemblyman Luis Nine, the incumbent in 
district 78 in the Bronx since 1970. His life as a public official 
began the following year. He occupied staff posts until his 
election to the city council in 1982, to represent the Bronx’s 
district 13. He was appointed Bronx borough president in 
1987, after the incumbent, Stanley Simon, was sent to prison 
for his involvement in a municipal scandal that rocked the 
Democratic Party. In September, he defeated Rafael Méndez 
on a primary and was elected in November to complete 
Simon’s term. During the general election, he defeated 
34 Frank Lynn, “Divided Opposition,” New York Times, February 16, 1985, p. 27.
35 Video interview with Robert García, June 19, 2004, used for the production of documentary 
Politics Con Sabor, Terramax Entertainment, LLC. Centro Archives. For a full and vivid account of the 
Wedtech scandal see William Sternberg and Matthew C. Harrison, Feeding Frenzy: The Inside Story of 
Wedtech (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1989).
36 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fernando_Ferrer <accessed June 9, 2008>.
37 See “Demonstración Ante la Junta de Instrucción,” Photo by Nury Hernández, El Diario-La 
Prensa, November 20, 1968, p. 1.
Republican Victor Tosi. Méndez stayed in the race on the 
New Alliance Party line, to no avail.38 Ferrer served for 14 
years as borough president. 
To Ferrer, the symbolic power of Badillo’s 1969 run for the 
mayoralty was tremendous, a source of inspiration for his own 
efforts.39 Yet, his 1997 campaign was a brief and feeble attempt 
that ended with him dropping out of the race to seek re-election 
of the borough presidency.40 On May 13, he declared: “A  
paramount part of my decision is the belief that we as 
Democrats must promote a stronger sense of purpose in order 
to defeat the Republican agenda of Rudolph Giuliani . . . I 
believe in the Democratic Party. It is for that reason, and after 
much deliberation, that I am taking the first step to unify 
behind one Democratic candidate, Ruth Messinger.”41 
Puerto Ricans were not happy with this turn of events. The 
excitement over Ferrer’s candidacy was so high that it prompted 
some to do what they had never done before: contribute money 
to the campaign. To many, his exit was a blow to what they 
considered the best opportunity to finally put a Puerto Rican in 
the city’s highest office.42 In addition, his withdrawal may have 
prevented the election for the first time of a Puerto Rican woman 
to the Bronx borough presidency. This was the hope of Shirley 
Remeneski but her aspiration was dashed by Ferrer’s decision. She 
considered herself a long shot because the party was not behind 
her but she never had a chance to confirm that guess.43 Once 
Ferrer was out, the Democratic Party endorsed Ruth Messinger. 
She went on to lose to incumbent Rudy Giuliani by over 200,000 
votes. Giuliani obtained 757,564 votes or 57 percent of the total 
to Messinger’s 540,075, or 41 percent. Interestingly, even though 
Giuliani’s support was mostly from white voters, he managed 
to make inroads into black and Latino constituencies.44 His 
38 Frank Lynn, “Ferrer Seen as Choice in the Bronx,” New York Times, April 11, 1987;
Josué R. Rivas and Sandra Rodríguez, “Eligirán hoy al próximo presidente de El Bronx,” El Diario-La 
Prensa, November 3, 1987, p. 2.
39 Video interview with Fernando Ferrer, c. 2004, used for the production of documentary Politics 
con Sabor, Terramax Entertainment, LLC, Centro Archives.
40 Jonathan P. Hicks, “Primary Races Expose Cracks in Once Unified Bronx Democratic Machine,” 
New York Times, September 22, 1997, p. B3.
41 “In His Own Words,” New York Times, May 14, 1997, p. B5.
42 Jonathan P. Hicks, “If His Party Was Unsurprised by Ferrer’s Move, Some Voters Are Crestfallen,” 
New York Times, May 14, 1997, p. B5.
43 Video interview with Shirley Remeneski, 2004, used for the production of documentary Politics 
Con Sabor, Terramax Entertainment, LLC. Centro Archives.
44 Marjorie Connelly, “A Portrait of New York City Voters,” New York Times, November 9, 1997, p. 
21; Adam Nagourney, “The 1997 Elections: The Parties; Evolving From Ideology Toward Pragmatism,” 
New York Times, November 6, 1997, p. B3.
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advantage of 16 percentage points over Messinger was 14 
points greater than his margin over David Dinkins in 1993.
In 2001, Ferrer tried his luck for the second time. Badillo 
came back briefly for the fifth time, seeking the nomination 
against Michael Bloomberg on the Republican line. At this 
point he was dubbed the perennial candidate. Like Badillo in 
1973, Ferrer was not able to make it past the primary. His 
demise came in the runoff election against Public Advocate 
Mark Green. The contest between Ferrer and Green was nasty 
and bitter. Ferrer was accused of being racially and ethnically 
divisive. Green was accused of engaging in racist tactics. In the 
end, Democrats confronted newcomer candidate Mike Bloomberg 
weak and divided. Green lost to Bloomberg narrowly, in large 
part due to the decision by many Latino voters to either sit 
out the election or vote for the Republican candidate. The 
example of Raul Amador, a 61-year-old accountant from 
Queens is emblematic of this behavior. “If it wasn’t going to 
be Ferrer, then, frankly, it didn’t matter that much who among 
these two Americans won,” he said. “Ferrer was one of us. The 
other two are about the same.” Nevertheless, had he voted, he 
added, he would have chosen Bloomberg.45 
thE 2005 ELEctioN
The clarion call of the 2005 campaign, sounded by the New 
York Times, was negative for Mayor Bloomberg. According to 
the Times, his challenge was to persuade New Yorkers that he 
deserved another chance to steer the city through the combined 
problems of a multibillion-dollar budget shortfall, disgruntled 
teachers, firefighters, and police officers waiting to get contracts, 
a financial crisis in public transportation and in public hospitals, 
a critically short supply of affordable housing, increasing  
numbers of homeless people, and a dearth of teachers and 
classroom space in the public school system.46 For his part, 
Bloomberg fired his own first shot of the campaign right in 
the heart of enemy territory. At Hostos Community College 
in the Bronx he touted his record, recalling that in 2001 he 
was presiding over a city full of doubts about its ability to 
overcome the effects of September 11. Now, he was proud to 
45 Mirta Ojito, “The 2001 Elections: The Voters; City’s Hispanics Shift, Moving Toward G.O.P.,” The 
New York Times, November 8, 2001, p. 5.
46  “A Wish for a Campaign Promise,” New York Times, January 2, 2005, Section 14, p. 9.
say, the city was safer, fiscally stable, and enjoying economic 
growth.47 On January 18, he went to the Canaan Baptist 
Church of Christ in Harlem to address a largely African-
American crowd on the commemoration of Martin Luther 
King’s birthday. There, Al Sharpton stung him by saying that 
it was not enough to quote King nor to remember him only 
once a year. Bloomberg took it all in stride and when it was 
his turn to speak was given a hearty reception by the audience.48 
Meanwhile, the Democratic contest for the nomination began 
with revelations that Gifford Miller, the city council speaker, 
was planning a smear campaign against Fernando Ferrer and 
Anthony Weiner. His plan included ignoring the black candi-
dates Charles Barron, a city councilman from Brooklyn, and 
C. Virginia Fields, the Manhattan borough president. Weiner 
was combative in his reaction, declaring himself ready for a 
fight. Ferrer’s camp put itself above the fray. “Fernando Ferrer 
is not concerned by or focused on other candidates’ strategies 
or what they may say about him,” said Ferrer’s campaign 
spokeswoman, Jen Bluestein. “Mr. Ferrer is completely 
focused on providing an alternative vision for New York City, 
and providing real leadership to address the affordability crisis 
New York’s families are facing: finding affordable housing, 
after-school programs for their kids, health care.”49
Above the fray or not, New Yorkers were not persuaded that 
Ferrer was the best candidate. According to the results of a 
poll conducted by Quinnipiac University, released in January 
20, both Ferrer and Bloomberg enjoyed almost equal support 
from likely voters. This was not good for Ferrer. Since 
February of 2004 he had held an advantage over Bloomberg 
of between four to seven percentage points.50 Now Bloomberg 
was making inroads among minority voters with his numbers 
rising 4 percentage points among blacks and 2 points among 
Hispanics. Also, 50 percent of voters gave him a favorable job 
rating compared to only 31 percent doing so in July 2003.51 
47 Tatsha Robertson, “Mayor Fights Own Image In N.Y. Race,” The Boston Globe, April 11, 2005, 
p. A1.
48 Michael Slackman, “A Day for Dr. King, Sharpton and Politics,” New York Times, January 18, 
2005, p. B3.
49 Winnie Hu, “Sparring Begins Among Democrats for Mayor,” New York Times, January 13, 2005, 
p. B1
50 Jim Rutenberg, “Metro Briefing New York: Manhattan: Bloomberg Catches Ferrer,” New York 
Times, January 20, 2005, p. B8.
51 David Saltonstall, “Bloomy On Up & Up In Poll,” Daily News, January 20, 2005, p. 19.
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This was remarkable given efforts by his rivals to portray him 
as a billionaire who was out of touch with the concerns of 
poor New Yorkers and more interested in catering to powerful 
corporate figures. Perhaps what was important to voters was 
the mayor’s unwavering attitude. Even though a majority was 
cool to the idea of building a new stadium on the west side of 
Manhattan, they could still see favorable leadership qualities in 
the incumbent. After all, it was hard to reject the possibility 
that the future might prove the mayor right. As he put it him-
self: “When people look back 10 years, 20 years, 30 years from 
now, they’ll say, ‘Thank God New Yorkers had the courage in 
tough times to go ahead and not listen to the naysayers, but to 
do the great things.’”52 
At the end of January, Ferrer suffered a blow from within. 
Bloomberg’s Republican rival in 2001, Herman Badillo, announced 
his endorsement of the mayor. The mayor “is doing fine,’’ said 
Badillo to the New York Times. “Crime overall has gone down. 
He has a housing program. He did a good job of cleaning the 
streets in the last snowfall. He’s created jobs. Overall, his  
performance is very good, but more important is his work on 
education.”53 Badillo’s standing among Latino voters was insig-
nificant but his gesture was symbolically powerful. To Ferrer, 
more challenging than Badillo’s endorsement of Bloomberg 
was the candidacy of C. Virginia Fields, which posed a dilemma 
for black leaders. It also raised the possibility of fostering 
debilitating racial divisions and conflict among Democrats.
In February, Ferrer was reportedly seeking to broaden his base 
of support, picking up endorsements from Democratic politicians 
who had backed Mark Green in 2001 and “talking extensively 
about the middle class.”54 Key support came in mid-month 
from the Village Independent Democrats, a group whose chosen 
candidate had won the Democratic nomination consistently in 
the four previous mayoral campaigns. His endorsement by 
Eliot Spitzer was also seen as key in the mobilization of white 
voters.55 At the same time, a minor insurrection took place 
within Ferrer’s camp when he expressed support for Judge 
52 Jim Rutenberg, “Stadium Push by Bloomberg May Come at His Political Peril,” New York Times, 
January 23, 2005, p. 29.
53 Michael Slackman and Jim Rutenberg, “Mayor Gets Big Boost From Elders Of His Party,” New 
York Times, January 27, 2005, p. B4.
54 Maggie Haberman, “Ferrer Gets Early Votes From Two Key State Pols,” Daily News, February 2, 
2005, p. 22.
55 “Spitzer’s man,” Financial Times, February 25, 2005, p. 12.
Doris Ling-Cohan’s decision to make gay marriage legal in 
New York. The Rev. Rubén Díaz Sr., a state senator from the 
Bronx, said that such support was the equivalent of “slapping 
us in our faces,” and warned Ferrer to be careful if he wanted 
support from Latinos. “We can tell our people throughout the 
Hispanic community and churches, don’t vote, stay home,” 
said Díaz. Another evangelical leader from the Bronx, Rev. 
Fernando Rodríguez, head of the Latin American Chaplain 
Association, said that “We’re closing our churches down for 
him to even visit.” Ferrer responded: “I’m consistent about 
not liking discrimination, and so when you’re faced with 
something like this, you have to act in the way that your heart 
tells you.”56
In March, New Yorkers were reminded of a remarkable fact:
“The percentage of black New Yorkers who have 
voted for the Republican mayoral candidate has 
increased fivefold since Rudolph W. Giuliani defeated 
Mr. Dinkins in 1993. Mr. Giuliani took only 5 percent 
of the black vote that year. That percentage grew to 
20 percent for Mr. Giuliani in 1997. Mr. Bloomberg 
took 25 percent of the black vote in 2001 against 
Mark Green. Last time around, Mr. Bloomberg won 
with 47 percent of the Hispanic vote, clearly benefit-
ing from a racially divisive primary between Mr. 
Ferrer and Mr. Green that left many Hispanic voters 
alienated when Mr. Green won a runoff election.”57 
No wonder that Bloomberg put a great a deal of effort in 
reaching out to minority voters—going to Hostos 
Community College and Canaan Baptist Church in January as 
well as ceremonies commemorating the death of Malcolm X 
and the achievements of Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., among 
other events targeting blacks and Latinos.
The one issue where the mayor could not get a firm footing 
on was his proposal to build the west side stadium. In March, 
a Quinnipiac University poll found that most respondents did 
not think the mayor cared about them. Ferrer was seen as 
56 Jim Rutenberg, “No Less Than Bloomberg, His Opponents Face a Test Over Stands on Gay 
Marriage,” New York Times, February 13, 2005, p. 39.
57 Jim Rutenberg, “Bloomberg Works to Keep Blacks Switching to the G.O.P.,” New York Times, 
March 2, 2005, p. B1.
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more sensitive to their problems and needs and 47 percent 
supported him compared to 39 percent for Bloomberg. 
Bloomberg was firm in his position. “I’m 63 years old and I’m 
not going to spend my life pandering to anybody,” he declared. 
“I’m going to do what I think is right for this city and I’m 
going to lead from the front and not the back.”58 At that point 
Ferrer was favored 61 to 23 percent by blacks and 65 to 27 
percent by Latinos. Bloomberg had the white vote 53 to 32 
percent.59 The question that kept surfacing about Ferrer was 
“Can he move beyond a minority coalition and attract white 
voters suspicious of a candidate who views the city as divided 
into two New Yorks? And can he shake off the sense that he is 
the product of a Bronx Democratic machine that has long been 
tainted by accusations of favoritism and even corruption?”60 
Then Amadou Diallo came storming in.61 At a meeting with 
members of the Sergeants Benevolent Association on Tuesday, 
March 15, Ferrer declared he did not believe the shooting of 
Diallo had been a crime. Further, he claimed that those 
responsible had been over-indicted. These statements were 
shocking to many, especially since Ferrer had protested the 
killing vehemently in 1999 and had called for a criminal trial. 
Charges of flip-flopping and pandering followed immediately 
in what the New York Times described as a political firestorm.62 A 
poll taken after Ferrer made his remarks showed 37 percent of 
924 registered voters interviewed saying they would be less 
likely to vote for him because of his comments. But Ferrer 
stayed ahead of the mayor 49 to 35 percent.63 Two major 
African-American public figures, Congressmen Major R. 
Owens and Edolphus Towns, endorsed Ferrer a week after the 
remarks were made. Puerto Rican Congresswoman Nydia 
Velázquez joined them, and all three tried to deflect attention 
from the Diallo issue by emphasizing Ferrer’s record of 
58 Winnie Hu and Charles V. Bagli, “Obstacle Rises for Bloomberg On West Side Stadium Plan,” 
New York Times, March 3, 2005, p. B1.
59 David Saltonstall, “Freddy Leading Mike Poll has Ferrer Ahead of Mayor by 8 Points,” Daily News, 
March 3, 2005, p. 4.
60 Diane Cardwell, “Ferrer Promoting Mayoralty as a National Democratic Goal,” New York Times, 
March 10, 2005, p. B1.
61 On February 4, 1999, Diallo, a 22-year-old Guinean immigrant, was shot at 41 times by New 
York City police officers who were searching his Soundview neighborhood for a rapist. His body was 
hit by 19 bullets, killing him instantly. See Ginger Thompson with Garry Pierre-Pierre, “Portrait of Slain 
Immigrant: Big Dreams and a Big Heart,” New York Times, February 12, 1999, p.1; Leslie Casimir, Bill 
Egbert, and Bill Hutchinson with Maureen Fan, “Throngs Say Farewell ‘Justice’ For Amadou is the Cry 
in Procession From Harlem,” Daily News, February 15, 1999, p. 7.
62 Diane Cardwell, “For Ferrer and the Police, A Shifting Relationship,” New York Times, March 18, 
2005, p. B3.
63 Jim Rutenberg, “Two Polls Show Ferrer Leading In a Race Against Bloomberg,” New York Times, 
March 22, 2005, p. B7.
accomplishments on socioeconomic issues and his progressive 
stance on racial relations.64 This came at the same time that Al 
Sharpton decided to back Bloomberg’s west side stadium project 
and Congressman Charles Rangel announced his endorsement 
of C. Virginia Fields. These announcements were seen as cracks 
in the black-Latino coalition that Ferrer needed to win.65 
In April, Ferrer’s fortunes began to change dramatically. He 
was described as a blubbering candidate who had begun to show 
signs of weakness in adversity. At a private meeting, former 
Mayor Ed Koch claimed that [Ferrer] had “slit his own throat” 
with the Diallo remarks.66 According to Michael Goodwin, a 
reporter for the Daily News, it was “business as usual. The 
wanna-bes are running on platforms with just two planks: ethnic 
and racial appeal, or platitudes suggesting Abe Lincoln was 
wrong—you really can fool all the people all the time.”67 Also 
in April, public speculation on the reasons for Al Sharpton’s 
and Charles Rangel’s open support of Bloomberg’s stadium 
proposal, Sharpton’s coy attitude towards Ferrer, and Rangel’s 
endorsement of C. Virginia Fields suggested that black leaders 
wanted Bloomberg to win. The rationale behind this was that 
a Bloomberg victory would allow their preferred candidate, 
Comptroller William “Bill” Thompson, to run in 2009 against 
a white candidate as opposed to a Latino incumbent. “Blacks 
and Hispanics have formed coalitions,” wrote Joyce Purnick, 
“but black-Hispanic rivalries are strong, too. Do black political 
leaders want to risk an eight-year run by a Mayor Ferrer, or 
would they rather have another four years with a grateful Mr. 
Bloomberg to clear the way for Mr. Thompson?”68 From the 
Sharpton camp the answer to the question was that to have 
such a plan was not only unnecessary but ridiculous.69 
Ferrer continued to poll ahead of Bloomberg but his margin 
slipped from 14 to 6 percentage points, largely as a result of 
64 Diane Cardwell, “Three in Congress Back Ferrer In Aftermath of Diallo Remark,” New York Times, 
March 24, 2005, p. B4.
65 Jim Rutenberg, “Lions, Lambs, Elephants, Donkeys and City Hall,” New York Times, March 30, 
2005, p. B1; Randal C. Archibold, “Rangel Backs Fields in Race To Challenge Bloomberg,” New York 
Times, April 1, 2005, p. B3.
66 Patrick D. Healy, “Strategists’ Advice to Bloomberg? Show You’re No Born Billionaire,” New York 
Times, April 8, 2005, p. A1.
67 Michael Goodwin, “Four Blind Mice On The Mayoralty,” Daily News, April 6, 2005, p. 43.
68  Joyce Purnick, “Foraging For the Truth In City Politics,” New York Times, April 11, 2005, p. B1.
69 Diane Cardwell, “Sharpton Backs No Candidate In the Primary,” New York Times, April 21, 2005, 
p. B1.
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the Diallo remarks.70 On April 11, in a forum at the Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Community Center, in the 
West Village, he was booed and hissed by the same people 
who had been cheering him before his statement. “What 
about Diallo,” shouted two members of the audience as Ferrer 
spoke. “Why did you say what you said?” screamed another. 
Visibly upset, Ferrer sat down and remained silent. “I think 
Freddy Ferrer is in real trouble, and I don’t know if he even 
realizes how much,” said Percy Sutton while also wondering if 
the Democrats could beat Bloomberg.71 On April 14, journalist 
Juan González came to Ferrer’s aid with a tortured defense of 
his “consistency” on the Diallo issue. His charge that the press 
was promoting racial divisions and his attack of C. Virginia 
Fields for siding with Giuliani and the police in 1999 was of 
little help.72 For his part, Ferrer tried to shift attention from 
the issue by proposing a reinstatement of a tax on stock transfers 
to pay for public education costs. Predictably, this did not go well 
in the financial community. More damaging was the reaction 
of Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver who joined those who 
rejected and ridiculed the proposal by arguing that it would 
not help the economy of the city.73 
Anthony Weiner called the stock transfer tax “sheer folly” and 
Bill Thompson quickly distanced himself from the proposal 
by hedging. The Daily News called it simplistic, silly, and nutty. 
According to the paper “kicking a political campaign into high 
gear by calling for a tax hike was, to put it charitably, a bold 
gambit,” a remark that was more sarcastic than laudatory. 
“What Ferrer sloughed off,” continued the editorial, “is that 
investors are not bound to the New York Stock Exchange and 
other trading floors. In these days of computerization, they 
can just as well do their transactions elsewhere, and avoid paying 
the tax. And there go thousands of financial-sector jobs.”74 The 
New York Times added its voice to the chorus of critics by call-
ing Ferrer’s proposal unimpressive and charging that it under-
mined the mayor’s negotiating position with the state.75 The 
70 Tatsha Robertson, “Mayor Fights Own Image...”
71 Patrick D. Healy and Jim Rutenberg, “Democratic Leaders Worry Over Mayoral Race,” New York 
Times, April 12, 2005, p. B1.
72 Juan González, “Ferrer Never Flip-Flopped,” Daily News, April 14, 2005, p. 20.
73 Diane Cardwell, “Ferrer Proposes Return of Tax on Stock Trades to Aid Schools,” New York 
Times, April 19, 2005, p. B8.
74 Editorial, “Freddy’s Stock Takes a Plunge,” Daily News, April 20, 2005, p. 38.
75 “About that Stock Transfer Tax,” The New York Times, May 1, 2005, p. 13.
proposal was also called an “economy killer” but it could have 
been called a candidate killer just as well. This was, in the 
short span of a month, the second major self-inflicted wound 
of the Ferrer campaign. Immediately after the fiasco, Al 
Sharpton announced that he would not be supporting anyone 
in the Democratic primary.76 
At this point, Ferrer was dubbed “gaffe-prone and ignorant” by 
New York Times reporter Diane Cardwell. The problem, in her 
view, was his “slip-ups, his seeming misstatements and the 
substance of his proposals.” Ferrer’s own response to these 
criticisms unwittingly reaffirmed them: “Look, I know that you’re 
running for the most important job in this city, the second-most 
important in the country, and you’re going to get scrutinized,” 
he said to Cardwell in a telephone interview. “I don’t mind the 
scrutiny. I do mind using a tense of the verb or any other lin-
guistic device as a convenient way to ignore 1.1 million kids.”77 
One could easily visualize a puzzled reader going, “huh?”
On April 27, a Marist Institute poll drove another nail into 
Ferrer’s campaign coffin. After leading the mayor by six points 
in March, Ferrer was now behind by a whopping 13 points, 38 
to 51 percent.78 “Polls are going to go up or down,” was 
Ferrer’s lame response to the news. The poll also showed an 
alarming slippage in support among blacks and only a small 
advantage over the mayor in support among Latinos.79 In 
March, 66 percent of blacks supported Ferrer compared to 45 
percent after the Amadou Diallo remarks. On the other hand, 
Bloomberg’s currency among blacks had gone up from 24 to 
44 percent. Among Latinos, Bloomberg was now trailing 
Ferrer by only six points—43 to 49 percent—compared to a 
disadvantage of 32 points—31 to 63 percent—in March.80 
This was simply amazing and there was still a primary to worry 
about. Ferrer endorsed Bloomberg’s subway-frisking policy (only 
to criticize it during the July television debate),81 accused the 
76 Diane Cardwell, “Sharpton Backs No Candidate...”
77 Diane Cardwell, “Ferrer Tries to Shift the Debate, and It Shoves Back,” New York Times, April 24, 
2005, p. 39.
78 Maggie Haberman, “Bloomy Zooms By Ferrer In New Poll,” Daily News, April 27, 2005, p. 3.
79 Michael Saul and Maggie Haberman, “Freddy’s Fall vs. Mike Just 1 Of His Woes,” Daily News, 
April 28, 2005, p. 12.
80 Maggie Haberman, “Blooming Good News For Mayor. Polls & Spirits On Rise,” Daily News,  
May 1, 2005, p. 19.
81  Patrick D. Healy, “In Debate, Candidates Unite in Criticizing Bloomberg,” The New York Times, 
July 29, 2005, p. B6. Ferrer called the policy ridiculous but only as the centerpiece of an anti-terrorism 
policy. In his view, the city needed bag searches as well as surveillance cameras, more police officers 
on subways and buses, and more workers in token booths.
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mayor of making contributions to anti-abortion politicians, 
lambasted Bloomberg for endorsing push-polls attacking him, 
but nothing stuck. The mayor was still considered competent, 
smart, and even good-looking, a reference that was played out 
in the press as a factor with the female vote.82 Yes, he seemed 
to be using his wealth to the tune of $140 million a year in 
charitable donations to buy political support from 843 recipient 
organizations.83 But the press found Ferrer’s flip-flopping a 
bigger flaw worth highlighting repeatedly. This enhanced Ferrer’s 
image as inconsistent and incompetent.84 Reporter John 
Podhoretz declared the Democratic candidates hopeless. “Not 
a single one of these four [Democrats] has a snowball’s chance 
in hell of beating Mike Bloomberg—short of the mayor being 
caught on video doing a Paris Hilton with a yak,” he said.85 
thE 2005 PRimARY ELEctioN
By mid-August Ferrer was ahead of the Democratic pack but, 
according to a Quinnipiac University poll, he was still short of 
the 40 percent needed to avert a runoff election. The poll showed 
Ferrer with 33 percent of the Democratic vote, Gifford Miller with 
17 percent, and Virginia Fields tied at 16 percent with Anthony 
Weiner.86 At the end of August, the New York Times reported that 
the contest between Miller and Weiner could prove decisive to 
the fortunes of Ferrer. “If the two each win large shares of the 
electorate,” reads the Times report, “and a third candidate, C. 
Virginia Fields, holds her own, the three could deprive Fernando 
Ferrer, who is leading in all [primary] polls, from winning 40 
percent of the vote, resulting in a runoff between the top two 
finalists.”87 At this point, Ferrer was essentially relying on his 
ethnic base for a strong showing. Polls consistently set support 
for his candidacy at 30 percent of likely primary voters.88 
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New York Post, September 12, 2005, p. 4; Carl Campanile, “Foes Fry Freddy Over Latest Death-
Penalty ‘Flip-Flop,’” The New York Post, October 8, 2005, p. 2.
85 John Podhoretz, “Dem Four: Walking Dead,” The New York Post, August 12, 2005, p. 33.
86 David Seifman, “It’s a Three-For-All to Face Ferrer in Runoff,” The New York Post, August 19, 
2005, p. 2. A Daily News story also published on August 19 had Fields and Gifford tied at 17 percent 
and Weiner having only 16 percent support. See Michael Saul, “Suddenly, a 3-Way Race for No. 2 
Dem,” Daily News, August 19, 2005, p. 2.
87 “Trying to Step Out of the Other Guy’s Shadow,” New York Times, August 29, 2005, p. B1.
88 “Trying to Step Out...”
On September 3, Ferrer received a lukewarm and backhanded 
endorsement from the New York Times. “If Mr. Ferrer is going 
to be a decent candidate in the fall,” reads the editorial, “he’s 
going to have to start talking like the intelligent public servant 
he used to be. If we’re going to make a leap of faith, we prefer 
to do it with Mr. Ferrer.”89 Meanwhile, Bloomberg continued 
to amass support. The same day that Sharpton announced he 
might endorse Ferrer, Bloomberg was endorsed by the hotel 
and textile workers’ unions as well as by District Council 1707 
of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees. These groups had a combined membership of 
75,000.90 Two days before the primary, Sharpton finally came 
through with his endorsement. The press questioned the ben-
efits of his support, arguing that Sharpton’s days as a kingmak-
er were essentially over, while suggesting that he could move 
voters but not so late in the game.91 
On September 13, primary day, as Ferrer campaigned in lower 
Manhattan a passerby shouted to him that he should win 
because “Rev. Al says so!”92 A WNBC/Marist poll suggested 
otherwise. Most registered Democrats declared that 
Sharpton’s endorsement would make no difference in their 
decision. The poll also showed that 26 percent of white 
Democrats were less likely to vote for Ferrer because of the 
endorsement, while 15 percent of black Democrats expressed 
the opposite feeling. Latino Democratic voters were equally 
divided with 11 percent saying the endorsement made them 
less likely to support Ferrer and 11 percent saying it made 
them more likely to vote for him.93 
Preliminary primary results showed that the concern over the 
share of the vote obtained by Miller and Weiner was on the 
mark. After all the precincts reported their results, Ferrer had 
39.949 percent of the vote, a fraction shy of the 40 percent 
89 Editorial, “A Democratic Candidate for Mayor,” The New York Times, September 3, 2005, p. 20. 
In October the Times proceeded to endorse mayor Bloomberg for re-election despite his “obscene 
unlimited spending on his political campaigns.” See Patrick D. Healy, “Times Endorses Mayor 
Bloomberg for Re-election,” The New York Times, October 23, 2005, p. 38.
90 Patrick D. Healy and Diane Cardwell, “Endorsement By Sharpton To Go to Ferrer,” The New York 
Times, September 10, 2005, p. B1.
91 Patrick D. Healy and Diane Cardwell, “Endorsement By Sharpton...”; Michael Saul, Celeste Katz 
and Maggie Haberman, “Al’s Revved for Freddy. Sharpton Throws His Support Behind Democratic 
Mayoral Front-Runner,” Daily News, September 11, 2005, p. 3.
92 Michael Saul, “Democrats in a Cliffhanger,” Daily News, September 14, 2005, p.4.
93 Michael Saul, “Rev. Al Shakes up The Primary,” Daily News, September 13, 2005, p. 6.
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needed to avoid a runoff.94 Anthony Weiner obtained 29 percent 
and Gifford Miller a mere 10 percent. This combined tally 
was significant enough to suggest that had the primary been a 
two- or even a three-way contest, Ferrer would have easily 
obtained the nomination. “The road has been long my friends,” 
said Ferrer after the precinct results were in. “And we’re almost 
there,” he added, “because we’re about to make history.”95 
Not surprisingly, the 2005 primary vote was low. This had 
been predicted by forecasters all along. Their estimates, how-
ever, proved to be higher than the actual turnout. The high 
point of enthusiasm for a primary race was in 1989 when 49 
percent of registered Democrats turned out to choose 
between David Dinkins, Ed Koch, Harrison Goldin, and 
Richard Ravitch. By 1993 that enthusiasm had waned to 22 
percent. In 2001, there was a slight surge in participation 
when 29 percent of Democrats bothered to cast a ballot.96 On 
primary day 2005, of 2,639,845 active registered Democrats, 
478,818 participated or 18.1 percent.97 This was considerably 
lower than the August estimates of between 600 and 650,000 
voters and lower than in previous contests.98 
The primary electorate appeared sharply divided by race. A 
preliminary analysis of selected districts published by the New 
York Times showed that Ferrer was largely supported by 
Latinos, Fields was largely supported by blacks, while Weiner 
and Miller were more strongly supported by whites than 
Ferrer and Miller were by Latinos and blacks respectively. 
This preliminary analysis also showed that, of all the candi-
dates, Ferrer had the greatest support among Latinos and 
blacks with a combined 94 percent support in selected dis-
tricts; in contrast, in those districts support for Fields was 88 
percent.99 In Richmond, the city’s whitest county (71 percent 
white), Ferrer lost to Antony Weiner by 2,420 votes. In the 
94 Patrick D. Healy, “Weiner Concedes Race for Mayor to Avert Runoff,” New York Times, 
September 15, 2005, p. A1.
95 Sara Kugler, “Ferrer Leads in Mayoral Primary,” Times Union, September 14, 2005, p. A3.
96 “Democratic Primary Voter Turnout,” New York Times, September 15, 2005, p. B8; http://
vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/results/2001/primaryelection/2001p.pdf <accessed September 15, 2005>; Sam 
Roberts, “Rethinking the Runoff,” New York Times, September 18, 2005, p. 37. 
97 http://vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/documents/boe/enrollment_totals/enrollmenttotals.pdf <accessed 
November 28, 2005>; http://vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/results/2005/primary/DemMayorPubAdvbyBoro.pdf 
<accessed November 28, 2005>
98 David Seifman, “‘Low’ Vote a High Note For Mayor & Freddy,” The New York Post, August 21, 
2005, p. 8; David Saltonstall, “Voter Turnout or Tuned Out? Low Numbers Expected Tuesday,” Daily 
News, September 10, 2005, p.10.
99 “Where the Candidates Found Support,” New York Times, September 15, 2005, p. B8.
Bronx, where Latinos and blacks were 80 percent of the popu-
lation, Ferrer won with 62 percent of the vote.100 These results 
still begged the question whether the divisions were a reflection 
of racism or other factors.
thE iSSuE oF RuNoFF ELEctioNS
The event that triggered the consideration of runoff elections 
in New York was the 1965 Democratic mayoral primary that 
selected Abraham Beame as the party’s mayoral candidate with 
only 32 percent of the vote. In 1969, when Mario Procaccino 
captured the Democratic nomination with only 33 percent of 
the vote to run against John Lindsay, a serious effort to institute 
the runoff primary got underway. A bipartisan mayoral panel was 
established and upon its recommendation the state legislature 
established the runoff effective in 1973. The law called for a 
runoff if no candidate for the offices of mayor, city council 
president, or comptroller received more than 40 percent of 
the votes in a primary. As noted earlier, that was the year when 
Herman Badillo sought the mayoral nomination for a second 
time. It is ironic that he lost the nomination to Abraham 
Beame in a runoff, given that he was a member of the biparti-
san panel that recommended its institution.101 
In 1985 a federal judge struck down the runoff law declaring it 
unconstitutional. But the law was upheld on appeal because, 
according to the court, “the record shows that the primary-
runoff law was never intended to deny minority voters—and 
does not have the effect of denying them—an equal opportu-
nity to participate in the political process.” Badillo was disap-
pointed and in a turnaround on his early attitude and position, 
called on the legislature to eliminate the requirement.102 
 In subsequent elections, the runoff contest did not involve any 
minorities. But in 1997, Ruth Messinger found herself pitted 
against a black candidate, the Rev. Al Sharpton. In this case, just 
as in 2005, a runoff was averted after the count of absentee ballots 
helped her reach the minimum 40 percent support required to 
become the candidate. In contrast to 2005, the loser in 1997 
did not bow out gracefully. Instead, Sharpton claimed fraud in the 
100 http://vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/results/2005/primary/DemMayorPubAdvbyBoro.pdf <accessed 
November 28, 2005>.
101 Sam Roberts, “Rethinking the Runoff...”
102 William G. Blair, “New York Runoffs Are Called Biased,” New York Times, June 4, 1985, p. B5; 
Arnold H. Lubasch, “Runoffs in New York’s Primaries Barred by U.S. Judge in Bias Suit,” New York 
Times, August 14, 1985, p. 1; Arnold H. Lubasch, “City Runoff in Primaries Is Upheld,” New York 
Times, December 14, 1985, p. 29.
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absentee ballot count and sued. The lawsuit was dismissed but 
Messinger’s candidacy was weakened and her support among black 
voters was undermined. It is said that 2001was similar to 1997 in 
one regard: just as many blacks refused to support Messinger after 
her feud with Sharpton, the runoff contest between Fernando 
Ferrer and Mark Green was so bitter that many Latinos refused 
to support Green. This enabled Bloomberg to win the mayoralty 
despite running as a Republican with no experience. 
One key argument against runoff elections is that they create 
divisions, often along racial and ethnic lines, that prevent 
opposition groups from working together to defeat a common 
adversary. After his 1973 defeat, Badillo supported a civil 
rights challenge to the runoff election by arguing that they 
encouraged negative campaigning and discriminated against 
candidates with little money. Al Sharpton was opposed to runoffs 
until 1997 when the runoff became his only opportunity to 
win the mayoral nomination. Later on he changed his mind 
reverting to the position that runoffs were biased against  
challengers and slowed down the selection process.103 
In truth, runoff elections channel divisions, acrimoniously or not, 
without necessarily creating them. Consider, for example, the 
lengths to which Anthony Weiner went to avoid disunity among 
Democrats after losing the primary by not only withdrawing 
from the 2005 race but also by emphasizing the need for all 
Democrats to support Ferrer. Whatever pragmatic calculations 
may have motivated his decision, it also reveals a moderate, 
conciliatory leadership style. A leadership style that exacerbates 
conflict makes divisions deeper, runoff or not. Al Sharpton was 
not conciliatory in 1997 nor in 2001. Ferrer chose to do nothing 
for Green in 2001. Was that an effect of the runoff or simple 
payback? Whether minority or coalition candidates are able to 
win the nomination in a runoff election is more a function of 
their access to resources and their ability to manage conflict 
than of the runoff itself. Further, in a racially polarized environment 
the runoff election matters little. If they are the majority, voters 
who are unwilling to support a minority candidate will carry 
the day whether there is a single primary or not.104 
103 This and the previous paragraph are based on Sam Roberts, “Rethinking the Runoff...”
104 Harold W. Stanley, “The Runoff: The Case for Retention,” PS: Political Science and Politics  18:2 
(Spring 1985): 231-236. Other research suggests that attitudinal changes over time, better minority 
candidates, and class explain minority success in runoff elections better than the runoff itself. See 
Charles S. Bullock, III and A. Brock Smith, “Black Success in Local Runoff Elections,” The Journal of 
Politics, 52:4 (November 1990): 1205-1220.
AFtER thE PRimARY
On September 19, uncertainty over the runoff ended with the 
announcement by John Ravitz, executive director of the elections 
board that “it is our determination, after doing a very thorough 
recanvassing of the paper ballots and machines, that there will 
not be a runoff between Anthony Weiner and Fernando Ferrer.”105 
Many thought the board had lost its senses by insisting on 
holding the runoff even after Weiner dropped out of the race. 
Thus, this news was greeted by all with a sigh of relief. The 
recanvassing put the vote for Ferrer at 192,243 or 40.15 percent 
of the total. The day after, 1199/SEIU endorsed Ferrer.106 
“Dennis Rivera has been a close friend of mine, we’ve fought 
on the same side of issues, for years now,” Ferrer said in 
response to 1199’s endorsement.107 This meant that he would 
have the support of his base plus the assistance of a well-oiled 
vote-getting organization. He was also poised to receive the 
backing of former mayor David Dinkins. “I like the mayor,” 
said Dinkins, “I consider [Bloomberg] a friend, but that does 
not mean that I am going to endorse his candidacy.”108 
After vowing to fight Ferrer to the bitter end, Weiner recon-
sidered his position and withdrew from the race. Ferrer was both 
surprised and elated. “I’m proud to support Freddy Ferrer,” Weiner 
declared, “He has the record, he has the brains, he has the commit-
ment, he has the understanding, to not only run in circles around 
Republican Mike Bloomberg, but to lift up our city.”109 Weiner 
may have been sincere when he declared himself willing to lose 
rather than to be part of an in-house fight that would doom the 
chances of defeating Bloomberg in November. Yet to the press 
it was clear that his decision was a mix of lofty and pragmatic 
considerations.110 On September 18, Congressman Charles Rangel 
switched his endorsement to Ferrer. To highlight black-Latino 
unity after the primary, Ferrer marched up Adam Clayton Powell, 
Jr. Boulevard in Harlem with Rangel, C. Virginia Fields, and 
Al Sharpton during the African-American Day Parade.111 
105 Diane Cardwell and Nicholas Confessore, “Ferrer is Likely to Get Backing of Workers In Health 
Care,” New York Times, September 20, 2005, p. B1.
106 Patrick D. Healy, “Facing United Challenge, Bloomberg Tacks Left,” New York Times, September 21, 
2005, p. A1.
107 Diane Cardwell and Nicholas Confessore, “Ferrer is Likely to Get Backing…”
108 Diane Cardwell and Nicholas Confessore, “Ferrer is Likely to Get Backing…”
109 Patrick D. Healy, “Weiner Concedes Race...”
110 Michael Saul and Celeste Katz, “Weiner Concedes,” Daily News, September 15, 2005, p. 7.
111 Al Baker, “In Harlem, Old Questions Cool Welcome for Ferrer,” New York Times, September 19, 
2005, p. B1.
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On September 21, New York Times reporter Patrick Healy declared 
that Ferrer was “in solid shape for the general election” after 
having “quickly united old rivals, labor leaders, and party 
elders behind him while also proving unexpectedly nimble at 
putting Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg on the defensive.”112 
This gloss on reality was strange given that Bloomberg  
continued to enjoy widespread support in the polls. At this 
point, Bloomberg’s campaign strategy seemed to hinge on 
broadening his support among white Democrats and  
good-government liberals while chipping away at Ferrer’s 
African-American and Latino base. He came out against the 
nomination of John Roberts to be the chief justice of the 
Supreme Court. He also criticized the Bush administration for 
a racially insensitive response to the devastation caused by 
hurricane Katrina. According to Stu Loeser, a spokesman for 
Bloomberg’s campaign, Ferrer was stuck with his traditional 
supporters. In contrast, the mayor was making inroads among 
Ferrer’s base. “We are playing on his turf; he’s not playing on 
ours,” Loeser said.113 
When Ferrer’s campaign unveiled its slogan—“It’s a great city. 
It could be greater”—the snide remarks immediately followed.114 
According to some, the endorsements of David Dinkins, 
Charles Rangel, and SEIU/1199 were just “low-hanging fruit.”115 
Ferrer needed a bigger television presence, which the cam-
paign could not afford, a focus on policy issues, an emphasis 
on competence and efficiency in governance, a rejection of 
partisanship, and a greater emphasis on class inequality.116 
Instead of following this advice Ferrer claimed that he would 
win because “God is on my side.”117 He was immediately blast-
ed by Bloomberg. “I don’t know that God makes political 
endorsements. I’ve never heard God do that,” said the mayor 
facetiously during a ribbon-cutting ceremony in Brooklyn.118 A 
Bloomberg supporter, the Rev. A.R. Bernard of the Christian 
Cultural Center in southeast Queens, added: “I spoke to God 
112 Patrick D. Healy, “Facing United Challenge…”
113 Patrick D. Healy, “Facing United Challenge…”
114 Patrick D. Healy, “Who’ll Dispute This New Slogan? Who Will Remember It?,” New York Times, 
September 26, 2005, p. B4.
115 Patrick D. Healy, “Who’ll Dispute…”
116 Patrick D. Healy, “Who’ll Dispute…”
117  Stephanie Gaskell and David Seifman, “Mayor Lords it Over Freddy for God Claim,” The New 
York Post, September 27, 2005, p. 2.
118 Stephanie Gaskell and David Seifman, “Mayor Lords it…”
this morning and he never mentioned anything about Freddy 
Ferrer.”119 When asked by a reporter if God was indeed on his 
side, Ferrer lamely replied: “I hope so.”120 In October, Ferrer 
alienated some of his gay supporters by standing side by side 
at a campaign event with homophobic Senator Rubén Díaz, 
Sr. “It’s disappointing that Mr. Ferrer has chosen to campaign 
with someone with such a history of anti-gay comments,” said 
Patrick Murphy, a gay candidate for city council in Manhattan 
and a member of the national board of directors of the Log 
Cabin Republicans.121 
From thereon, nothing worked for Ferrer. If he didn’t attack 
the mayor he was too soft; if he attacked the mayor he was too 
negative. His criticism of Bloomberg as racially insensitive for 
refusing to debate him at the Apollo Theater was thrown back 
at him as race-baiting.122 His calls for more affordable housing 
and universal health insurance became cries in the wilderness. 
How could anyone take seriously a candidate who campaigned 
in Puerto Rico to persuade Puerto Rican New Yorkers to vote 
for him?123 This was one of the silliest and most wasteful moves 
of his campaign. On October 16, Daily News reporter Michael 
Goodwin wrote: “In the Bible, the Four Horsemen of the 
Apocalypse are named Death, War, Famine and Pestilence. If 
you’re a New York City Democrat, they are named David Dinkins, 
Ruth Messinger, Mark Green and Fernando Ferrer. Like some 
ancient scourge, those four have taken turns killing their party’s 
dreams of winning City Hall.”124 At that point, even the 
Democratic Party was certain Ferrer would lose. By then the 
party put a hold on a February promise of $1 million in cam-
paign funds. According to party insiders it was imprudent to invest 
so much money on a candidate with no chance of winning.125 
NoVEmbER 8: REgiStRAtioN ANd tuRNout
In 2001, there were 2.4 million registered Democrats in New 
York City. By 2005 the enrollment figure was 2.6 million. The 
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123 Heidi Singer, “Freddy Tries to Get Out The Vote - In Puerto Rico”, The New York Post, October 
16, 2005, p. 13.
124 Michael Goodwin, “United, They Stall,” Daily News, October 16, 2005, p. 39.
125 David Seifman and Carl Campanile, “National Dems Have Stiffed Ferrer for $1M,” The New York 
Post, October 11, 2005, p. 2.
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200,000 increase was unprecedentedly high, much of it the 
result of intense voter registration efforts in 2004 during the 
presidential election.126 In contrast, Republican registration in 
the city did not grow in any significant way. This was not  
surprising. In 2004, Republicans had wisely ignored not just 
New York City but the entire state, despite having chosen the 
city for their national convention. It was one thing to use New 
York to energize the party for the last stretch of the presidential 
race and another to invest resources in a state that was guaranteed 
to go to the Democrats. Could it be that turnout by newly 
registered Democratic voters could beat the odds against Ferrer?
A count of Spanish surnames on the voter rolls in 2005 revealed 
that at 680,000, Latinos were 26 percent of Democratic regis-
trants. According to reporter Juan González, this suggested 
that Latinos accounted for as much as half of the 200,000 
increase in Democratic registrations since 2001. “The person 
most likely to benefit from all of this is Fernando Ferrer,” he 
wrote. “Many Hispanic residents have grown tired of being 
regarded as second-class citizens in this town. They’ve longed 
for decades to see one of their own leaders become mayor. 
That’s why Ferrer captured more than 80 percent of the 
Latino vote in his losing runoff four years ago against fellow 
Democrat Mark Green.”127 
González suggested that in 2005 Ferrer could count on 65 
percent of Latino Democrats. That was the case in March, but 
after the Amadou Diallo remarks, Latino support for Ferrer 
decreased by 16 points to 49 percent. During the primary, 
Latinos were steadfast in their support of their compatriot. 
But even in the Bronx, his 62 percent tally included the votes 
of blacks. An October 26 poll revealed that among Latino vot-
ers Ferrer led Bloomberg by only five points, 48 percent to 43 
percent.128 He was behind with everyone else—liberals, blacks, 
women, even Democrats. Democrats represented 53 percent 
of the voters but only 37 percent intended to support Ferrer. 
In contrast, 49 percent were expected to vote for Bloomberg.129 
126 Juan González, “Hispanics Can Win it For Freddy,” Daily News, August 18, 2005, p. 14.
127 Juan González, “Hispanics Can Win it...”
128 Frankie Edozien, “Freddy Losing Latin Edge: Poll,” The New York Post, October 26, 2005, p. 2.
129 Patrick D. Healy and Marjorie Connelly, “Even Among Democratic Voters, Poll Finds Ferrer Is 
Well Behind,” The New York Times, October 28, 2005, p. A1.
The general election vote went just about as predicted by 
many after the primary, except that it was worse than predict-
ed for Ferrer. In September, it was expected that Ferrer would 
lose to Bloomberg 47 to 53 percent. The results were not 
even close to the prediction. Ferrer received 477,903 votes to 
Bloomberg’s 723,635, losing 39 to 59 percent.130 This was the 
highest victory margin in a mayoral race since 1937. Ferrer 
completed the race as the lowest Democratic vote-getter in 
the city since 1917.131 About half of the black vote went to 
Bloomberg and close to 3 in 10 Latinos supported the incum-
bent. Bloomberg lost Harlem but the vote for him there was a 
significant 45 percent. Most of his black support came from 
middle-class African-Americans and West Indians. In south-
eastern Queens he carried the entire 29th assembly district 
and also beat Ferrer in several largely Caribbean districts in 
central Brooklyn. For his part, Ferrer won the Bronx, 
Washington Heights, and did best in neighborhoods with 
high Puerto Rican concentrations.132 
According to a poll by Pace University, 30 percent of Latinas 
supported Bloomberg; they were the least likely to vote for 
him. Jews were the most likely to support Bloomberg’s re-
election with 7 out of 10 doing so. This poll attributed less 
support for Bloomberg from blacks— 46 percent compared to 
53 percent for Ferrer. In this survey, Ferrer also edged 
Bloomberg among Democrats—50 to 48 percent. The find-
ings for Latinos were 62 to 36 in favor of Ferrer. Bloomberg 
was found winning the votes of whites at 66 percent and the 
votes of all religious groups—72 percent of Jews, 58 percent 
of Protestants, and 57 percent of Catholics. Astonishingly, 
even a majority of those making less than $20 thousand a 
year—56 percent—voted for Bloomberg.133 
Ferrer was certain that his populist message had been heard. 
In his view, his defeat was not his fault. “I have the dubious 
distinction of having run against the best-financed candidate 
130 “The Races in New York City,” New York Times, November 10, 2005, p. B6.
131 Patrick D. Healy, “Bloomberg Cruises to Re-election Victory, The New York Times, November 9, 
2005, p.1.
132 Sam Roberts, “Mayor Crossed Ethnic Barriers For Big Victory,” The New York Times, November 10, 
2005, p. A1.
133 Carl Campanile, “The Mike Spike; Breakdown of Mayor’s Landslide Victory,” The New York 
Post, November 10, 2005, p. 29. According to Juan González, “Higher-income neighborhoods, 
whether black or white, went for Bloomberg, while the poorest neighborhoods, including all those 
with big Latino populations, went for Ferrer.” He provided no evidence to support this claim. See Juan 
González, “Freddy Holds Head High,” Daily News, November 10, 2005, p. 8.
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in the history of American politics,” Ferrer said. “I wouldn’t 
change the last year for all the money in the world.”134 Was 
money the explanation for defeat?
thE RoLE oF moNEY iN 2005
At the beginning of the campaign, the money issue took a  
surreal turn. The New York Times noted the well-known fact 
that the incumbent was “a billionaire capable of spending 
hundreds of millions of dollars of his own money on the race.” 
At the same time, Molly Watkins, the press secretary for the 
Campaign Finance Board, declared that “The whole point of 
the [matching funds] program and why it’s good in a situation 
like this is it really equalizes everybody, at the end of the day 
everybody will have about the same money to spend.”135 
According to Ferrer’s chief fundraiser, Leo Hindery, Jr., 
Bloomberg’s deep pockets were Ferrer’s biggest challenge. “Mike 
has something we’ve never seen before, which is literally a 
bottomless checkbook,” he said during a private conversation 
that was inadvertently broadcast to a reporter’s voice mail. “We 
live in this $4,950 world [referring to the limit per donor set 
by the Campaign Finance Board]—we’re thrilled to get a $250 
check—and we can’t do it without reaching outside the city.”136 
By May, Bloomberg had spent about $5.6 million on his campaign 
out of $6.5 million he had at his disposal from his own money. 
In contrast, Ferrer had spent only $245,000.137 Ferrer was limited by 
law to spending only $5.7 million in the primary race. The mayor 
faced no limits due to his reliance on private resources. Another 
angle in the use of personal resources concerned the role 
played by philanthropic giving by the mayor in his political 
fortunes. In 2004 Bloomberg’s giving to city charities amounted 
to millions of dollars, including organizations in black and 
Hispanic neighborhoods. To many this was an avenue for 
obtaining political support that was not only questionable but 
also unavailable to the mayor’s opponents.138 The practice and 
the charges were repeated in 2005.
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Was Bloomberg predestined to win because of his financial 
resources? In 2001, he spent $74 million of his own money on 
the campaign, outspending Mark Green five times over. Yet his 
victory was initially too close to call.139 Ultimately, his money 
advantage earned him a margin of a little over 43,000 votes or 
3 percentage points. Bloomberg received 719,819 votes, or 50 
percent, while Green had 676,560 or 47 percent.140 Only those 
willing to ignore the role of incumbency, Democratic infight-
ing, racial conflict and resentment between blacks and Latinos, 
and the contrast between the campaign performances of Ferrer 
and the mayor can claim that his money was everything in 
2005. According to reporter Clyde Haberman: “even without 
the tens of millions of dollars that he can spend, Mr. Bloomberg 
would have the upper hand.” New Yorkers “may not collectively 
adore him. But neither are they turned off by him.”141 
Two days before the election, Democratic leaders were already 
providing a money rationale for Ferrer’s anticipated defeat. 
“This is now a major problem for us,” said Charles Rangel, “that 
the guy from the block who works hard for the party doesn’t 
stand much chance against the guy who has $75 million.”142 In 
a post-election analysis, another Democratic Party leader claimed 
that “money was everything” in the race. According to 
Assemblyman Herman “Denny” Farrell, Bloomberg spent so 
much money in advertisements that his campaign de facto 
suppressed the vote. In his view, this was all with the blessing 
provided by the rules of the city’s Campaign Finance Board.143 
Turnout was indeed dismal. According to the Board of Elections, 
the total number of active registered voters in the city as of 
March 2005 was 3,903,852. According to the New York Times 
of November 10, 2005 the mayoral vote was 1,201,538 or 30.7 
percent of registered voters. Thus, if turnout was critical to a 
Ferrer victory, the explanation of his defeat is simple. Bloomberg 
deployed close to 10,000 volunteers on election day in a get-out-
139 Adam Nagourney, “The 2001 Elections: Mayor Bloomberg Edges Green in Race for Mayor,” The 
New York Times, November 7, 2001, p. A1; Michael Saul, “Mike Barely Misses Mark Set By Fiorello,” 
Daily News, November 30, 2005, p. 14.
140 Stefan Fatsis, “Mayoral Race in New York is too Close to Call,” Wall Street Journal, November 
6, 2001, p. A12; David Usborne, “Campaign Against Terrorism: Billionaire Who Swamped City With 
Dollars Inherits a Troubled Legacy,” The Independent (London), November 8, 2001, p. 3.
141 Clyde Haberman, “Long Shots Do Come In. Ask the Mayor,” The New York Times, May 17, 
2005, p. B1.
142 Patrick D. Healy, “For the City’s Democrats, a Grim Future Could Last Long Beyond Tuesday,” 
The New York Times, November 6, 2005, p. 41.
143 Remarks by Assemblyman Herman “Denny” Farrell, Workshop on the 2005 New York City 
Mayoral Election, Somos el Futuro Winter Conference, November 13, 2005, Wyndham El San Juan 
Hotel, Isla Verde, Puerto Rico.
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the-vote (GOTV) blitz. Ferrer had only a few thousand peo-
ple working the streets and the phones. His GOTV effort was 
highly reliant on hope—on the wish that his supporters would 
turn out in droves.144 
There is no reason why the Democratic party organization 
had to be left behind by the Bloomberg campaign’s GOTV 
effort. Bloomberg mobilized volunteers rather than paid workers. 
The Democratic Party could have matched that number 
instead of making a minimal effort and wishing for the best. In 
fact, it could be argued that the abandonment of Ferrer by the 
party contributed more to his defeat than his money troubles.145 
In any event, turnout in 2005—31 percent—was much higher 
than in 2001—14.5 percent—even though Bloomberg  
overspent his rivals in both elections by large margins. This 
inconsistency makes the claim of vote suppression due to  
campaign spending suspect.146 
In 2005 Bloomberg spent just as much as in 2001. Was his 
victory a case of “votes count, but resources decide”? If that 
was the case, how does one explain a similar amount of money 
producing widely different margins of victory in two different 
elections? The answer to the question comes down to this: 
Despite his failings, Bloomberg was a relatively popular incum-
bent and Ferrer proved to be an ineffectual challenger. As the 
New York Post put it on election day: “Michael Bloomberg, he’s 
proven his competence, kept crime down and breathed hope 
into the schools; his opponent, Fernando Ferrer, has no viable 
plan.”147 Money or not, Bloomberg had so much going for 
him that even a better and better-funded challenger than 
Ferrer may not have stood a chance of defeating him.
A PuERto RicAN (LAtiNo oR miNoRitY) mAYoR 
FoR NEw YoRK?
Herman Badillo was able to win a seat in Congress in 1970 
for a number of reasons, the most important being running in 
144 Patrick D. Healy, “Bloomberg Cruises…”
145 The Clintons for example, did for Ferrer only what they were asked and not more. In 2001 
President Clinton campaigned three times with Mark Green but only once with Ferrer in 2005. 
Hillary distanced herself from Ferrer lest she alienate a mayor that by all accounts acted more like a 
Democrat than a Republican. See Patrick D. Healy, “Clintons Give Ferrer a Hand While Staying at 
Arm’s Length,” The New York Times, October 21, 2005, p. A1; Errol Louis, “Disgrace of The Dems. 
Vaunted Party Organization Abandoned Ferrer & Its Principles,” Daily News, November 9, 2005, p. 39.
146 See Diane Cardwell, “The 2001 Elections: The Voting; Confusion, but It Was No Florida,” The 
New York Times, November 7, 2001, p. D1
147 “Vote Today,” The New York Post, November 8, 2005, p. 32.
a congressional district that was demographically tailored for 
victory. This was not the case when he sought the mayoral 
candidacy in 1969, 1973, and 1977. Babby Quintero was right 
in noticing the demographic spread of Puerto Ricans in the 
city during the 1960s but she overestimated the impact of 
their growth in population. By 1970, Puerto Rican numbers 
had increased by 33 percent but they were only 10 percent of 
the total population and about 9 percent of the electorate.148 
Fourteen years later, their share of the electorate had increased 
by only one percentage point. In 1977, an important segment 
of the white electorate may have been ready for a Puerto 
Rican mayoral candidate, as reflected in the endorsements of 
the New York Political Action Council and sociologist 
Herbert Gans, but, as the actions of Percy Sutton, David 
Dinkins and Charles Rangel suggest, African Americans were 
not. Even in 1985, when Badillo’s chances for the nomination 
were best, the city’s Puerto Rican/Latino electorate was still 
small and African Americans were still not ready for him.149 
The problem of the size and nature of the electorate was an 
issue later on as well. In 2001 Hispanics were between 15 and 
18 percent of voters but the Hispanic electorate was highly 
fractured and riddled with fault lines and tensions.150 In 2005, 
Rodríguez was the most common surname in New York voter 
registration rolls and the city was majority minority. But Mexicans 
felt ignored by Ferrer, C. Virginia Fields drew resources away 
from him in the Dominican community, and unlike in Los 
Angeles, Hispanics were not key coalition partners.151 In 2001 
and 2005, these contextual factors simply compounded a critical 
situation created by the lack of an effective candidate.
For Badillo, ethnicity was a double-edged sword. But ethnicity 
was not the only factor that militated against him. He was 
perceived as rigid and arrogant, did not have support from key 
elements of the labor movement, and in one instance was stymied 
by his inability to meet the legal requirements necessary to 
148 Peter Kihss, “Census Disputed on Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, April 20, 1972, p. 36; 
“El Diario-La Prensa Speaks,” editorial, November 7, 1972, p. 17; Miguel Gallastegui, “Millones de 
Votantes Hispanos Concurrirán A Ejercer su Deber Cívico en las Elecciones,” El Diario-La Prensa, 
November 7, 1972, p. 15.
149 At least not African-American political leaders, as Chris McNickle  shows. Op. Cit., pp. 285-286.
150 Elizabeth Kolbert, “That’s Freddy; Can race politics make Fernando Ferrer the next mayor?” The 
New Yorker, March 19, 2001, p. 52;  Sam Roberts, “New York’s Ever-Changing Electorate: Next, The 
White Minority,” New York Times, September 13, 2005, p. 1.
151 Roberts, “New York’s Ever-Changing…;” Diane Cardwell and Jonathan P. Hicks, “On West 
Coast, A Lesson Plan for Ferrer Bid,” New York Times, May 20, 2005, p. 1.
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run. Badillo prided himself as a maverick but this also cost 
him. He was not always able to rally the necessary troops fully 
behind him in part because of his reputation as nobody’s yes-man 
and in part because Puerto Rican elites and the community 
itself were divided.152 All this notwithstanding, given his back-
ground and the context in which he did so, it is remarkable 
that he was able to mount four credible attempts to gain the 
mayoral nomination. To follow his ambition Badillo had to 
fight the party organization and he had to fight the system. 
But neither the party structure nor the political establishment 
was foreclosed to his overtures. He was never a party regular 
but he used party resources when it suited him. He successfully 
challenged the rules of the game when they were unfavorable 
to his goals and he did so with the very tools provided by the 
political system. Ultimately, he was an odd figure: a reformer 
to some, a loose cannon to others. When the party was king, 
he fought the party. Others were successful running as outsid-
ers, most notably Wagner in 1961 and Frank Torres in 1962. 
But Torres ran in an assembly district, not citywide, and 
Wagner had a citywide base of support outside the machine 
that Badillo never had. 153
In 2005 Fernando Ferrer was rightly characterized as an 
imperfect candidate. He had his three chances and in his case 
the Spanish saying applies; in the future there will be no 
Freddy to kick around. If there had been a better Puerto 
Rican candidate, would have he been a loser as well? This is 
quite likely. As early as August, Latinos, for example, were 
persuaded that Bloomberg had a good record. The leadership 
qualities they were looking for in the next mayor pretty much 
described the incumbent: independent, knowledgeable, and 
decisive.154 Bloomberg had plenty of money to get his  
message across in targeted fashion. But he was also able to 
craft a message that appealed to a broad spectrum of voters 
across class, race, and ethnicity. Another factor was his ability 
to distance himself from President Bush. His criticism of the 
administration’s response to the Katrina disaster in Louisiana 
helped him with minority voters. His rejection of John 
152 He was considered “a loner” and not particularly interested in advice from others. See video 
interviews with Manuel “Manny” Díaz, June 10, 2004 and Armando Montano, 2004, used for the pro-
duction of documentary Politics Con Sabor, Terramax Entertainment, LLC. Centro Archives.
153 Video interview with Frank, Austin, and Alma Torres, 2004, used for the production of documen-
tary Politics Con Sabor, Terramax Entertainment, LLC. Centro Archives.
154 National Association of Elected and Appointed Officials, Voces del Pueblo Project (2005).
Roberts for the Supreme Court endeared him to pro-choice 
Democrats. Finally, his campaign was managed efficiently,  
in a way that Ferrer’s was not. Compared to Ferrer, whose 
gaffes destroyed his credibility, the mayor appeared to be a 
superb manager.155 
According to Newsday, Ferrer lost because he ran an inefficient 
campaign. Money disadvantages were a factor but the lack of 
an effective message also played a role. The Amadou Diallo 
remarks in March and his stock trades tax proposal in April 
turned the tide of support against him. His lack of a concrete 
agenda and Democratic defections were crucial as well.156 In 
Brooklyn and Queens County, party leaders provided little or 
no support to Ferrer’s campaign.157 One reason given for the 
absence of support by some Democrats was lingering resentment 
against Ferrer. Many Democrats blamed his campaign manager 
Roberto Ramírez for handing Bloomberg the mayoralty in 2001 as 
a result of the refusal of Ferrer’s campaign to support Mark 
Green.158 Ferrer’s appeal to Democrats was also undermined 
by the fact that Bloomberg endorsed income tax increases for 
wealthy New Yorkers, health care for the uninsured and other 
social services, and considered an extension on a temporary 
tax surcharge on individuals with incomes of $500,000 a year. 
This made the mayor appear more like the Democrat he had 
been all his life before he switched to the Republican Party in 
order to be able to run in 2001.159 
Ferrer also fought against significant historical odds. Only 
twice in fifty years had a challenger unseated a mayoral 
incumbent after one term—when Abraham Beame was 
replaced by Ed Koch in 1977 and when Rudolph Giuliani 
defeated David Dinkins in 1993. In both cases the voters  
perceived the incumbents as failures, an assessment that very 
few shared about Bloomberg. Ferrer’s place in history was 
ironic, an example of Puerto Ricans being in the right place at 
the wrong time; he was a product of the regular Democratic 
155 Lisa L. Colangelo and David Saltonstall, “Bloomberg Wins by a K.O. Crushes Ferrer by Nearly 
20-point margin,” Daily News, November 9, 2005, p. 3.
156 Bryan Virasami and Graham Rayman, “Election 2005; In Defeat Ferrer Silent on his Future,” 
Newsday, November 9, 2005, p. A20.
157 Dan Janison, “Big Win for Bloomberg,” Newsday, November 9, 2005, p. A2.
158 Diane Cardwell, “Racial Politics of 2001; Unhealed Wounds in 2005,” The New York Times, May 8, 
2005, p. 33.
159 Jim Rutenberg and Patrick D. Healy, “3 Democrats and the Mayor Vie for Third Party’s Nod,” 
The New York Times, May 12, 2005, p. B3.
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organization at a time when machine politics was discredited.160 
Widely reported feelings of despair among Democrats about 
their prospects, including public discussions about the possi-
bility of the late entrance of a better challenger, also under-
mined Ferrer’s standing among voters.161 Had the nomination 
been a formal contractual arrangement, such discussions 
would have been tantamount to a breach of contract.
Did polls cause Ferrer’s defeat, as Roberto Ramírez emphatically 
declared after the election?162 Polls both reflect and shape 
public opinion. Push polls in particular, shape more than 
reflect public opinion. The polls that suggested that Ferrer 
might not be able to avoid a runoff and the ones that measured 
his popularity and predicted his defeat were not push polls but 
rather legitimate surveys. It is impossible to know whether the 
forecast that he would be short of the 40 percent support 
required to avoid a runoff primary was a factor shaping the 
primary result. But if anything, Ferrer beat that particular poll 
by a significant margin—the prediction was that he would 
receive 33 percent of the vote; instead he obtained a little over 
the required 40 percent. One thing is clear: as Ferrer’s behavior 
became more and more erratic, his support in the polls began 
to go down. The positions Ferrer took were his own. No poll 
told him to flip-flop or to show incompetence. The fact that 
polls predicted his failure is no evidence that pollsters con-
spired against Ferrer. 
Did the election show that pragmatism and competence trump 
ideology? Giuliani’s wide-margin victory over Ruth Messinger 
in 1997 was seen as proof that competence was more important 
than ideology. The same claim was made immediately after 
the 2005 election. To win, the Democratic Party should 
160 “Ferrer came of age in the days when the Bronx Democratic organization was still a robust 
(and largely Jewish) enterprise, and he got ahead not by challenging the machine but by working 
within it.” Elizabeth Kolbert, “That’s Freddy; Can race politics make Fernando Ferrer the next mayor?” 
The New Yorker, March 19, 2001, p. 52. Mollenkopf, et al. characterize New York City as “highly 
centralized and politicized, with a persistent ‘machine politics’ style.” (p. 2)  In John Mollenkopf, Ana 
Champeny, Raphael Sonensheim, and Mark Drayse, “Race, Ethnicity, and Immigration in the 2005 
Mayoral Elections in Los Angeles and New York,” paper presented at the American Political Science 
Association meetings, September 2, 2006, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. It is true that in New York City 
the Democratic party organization is alive and well but the electorate and the media are not keen on 
the idea. As Fernando Ferrer found out, his association with regular machine politics was a nega-
tive with the press and the public. More recently, speculation on what lies ahead for New York after 
Bloomberg has suggested that economic notables “value a business resumé over party affiliation” and 
the public worries that once Bloomberg is gone the city may “revert to a traditional partisan-infused 
bureaucracy.” See Michael Barbaro, “As Bloomberg’s Time Wanes, Titans Seek Mayor in his Mold,” 
New York Times, July 7, 2008, p. A1.
161 Patrick D. Healy, “Democrats Still Searching For a Stronger Challenger,” The New York Times, 
May 23, 2005, p. B3.
162 Remarks by Roberto Ramírez, Workshop on the 2005 New York City Mayoral Election,  
Somos el Futuro Winter Conference, November 13, 2005, Wyndham El San Juan Hotel, Isla Verde, 
Puerto Rico.
emphasize managerial ability, not ethnic appeal. But why should 
it be one or the other? If the history of New York City politics 
shows anything is that ethnic appeals are part and parcel of 
the city’s political process. Ethnicity is real, it cannot be wished 
away. Changing demographics change the character of ethnicity 
over time but ethnic identity and the role it plays in the political 
process, for better or for worse, is a constant variable.
Before ballots were cast in New York, many wondered if Ferrer 
would be able to follow in the footsteps of the newly elected 
mayor of Los Angeles, Antonio Villaraigosa. Ferrer even sought 
the endorsement of the Los Angeles mayor, hoping it would 
help his efforts.163 In fact, the Los Angeles mayoral election 
holds a lesson for the future but it is not that competence trumps 
ideology. James Hahn’s inability to consolidate his alliance with 
African-Americans benefited Villaraigosa. Hahn also alienated 
key supporters by fighting the secession movement in the San 
Fernando Valley and was hurt by charges of administrative 
improprieties. He was unlucky rather than incompetent. 
Villarraigosa did not campaign on the basis of competent 
solutions to the city’s problems. He avoided ideological  
posturing rather than ideology. His plans were ambiguous and 
his emphasis was on the need for change. He also built a 
broad coalition of supporters. He was competent but, perhaps 
more importantly, he was also lucky.164 
Finally, there is the issue of race and ethnicity. Bloomberg did 
very well among minority voters, particularly among Latinas 
who were the segment of the electorate least likely to favor 
him. This strongly suggests that racial and ethnic prejudice 
was not Bloomberg’s trump card against Ferrer. Nevertheless, 
what do we make of the racially divided primary vote? Despite 
the primary’s racially delineated results it is unlikely that racial 
and ethnic prejudice were the driving force. By September it 
was clear that Ferrer’s overall loss of credibility and support 
was the result of other factors. Ferrer still held sway over black 
and Latino voters and his support among whites was significant. 
The willingness of whites, mostly hardcore liberals but also some 
Catholics, to support an out-group candidate was demonstrated 
163 Michael Saul, “A Big Lift for Freddy. L.A. Mayor Set to Endorse Him,” Daily News, August 25, 
2005, p. 2.
164 Raphael J. Sonenshein and Susan H. Pinkus, “Latino Incorporation reaches the Urban Summit: 
How Antonio Villaraigosa Won the 2005 Los Angeles Mayor’s Race,” PS: Political Science and Politics 
XXXVIII:4 (October 2005): 713-721.
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in 1989 with the election of David Dinkins.165 Polls in 2004 
and early 2005, suggested a Ferrer victory over Bloomberg in 
accordance to perceptions of Ferrer as an attractive alternative 
to an embattled incumbent. Once Ferrer’s true colors began to 
show he began to lose support; nothing he did after the primary 
stemmed the tide. Thus, the racial and ethnic delineation of 
the primary vote is more likely a case of ethnoracial solidarity 
and racial inoculation than racial polarization.166 
Divisions in partisan voting by race and ethnicity are sharp 
and persistent, for African Americans more so than for 
Latinos.167 Racial and ethnic divisions in voting generally are 
problematic but survey research has shown that, even though 
they are willing to support out-group candidates, given the 
choice, Latinos prefer to support a co-ethnic. No one can 
question the willingness of African Americans to support white 
candidates but they also tend to prefer their own candidates.168 
This dynamic may have been at play during the primary. The 
statement by Raul Amador in 2001 that he was willing to support 
Bloomberg but only if Ferrer was not a candidate because 
Ferrer was “one of us,” suggests a calculation along those lines. 
While Latinos, blacks, and whites could agree that Ferrer was 
not the best candidate, Latinos and blacks were more willing 
than whites to put that aside for the sake of ethnic solidarity. 
The fact that some blacks were readier than some whites to 
overlook Ferrer’s position on the murder of Amadou Diallo was 
a good illustration of inoculation: blacks were more tolerant 
165 See McNickle, Op. Cit., p. 305 and Asher Arian, et al., Changing New York City Politics (New 
York: Routledge, 1991). Dinkins’ downfall had little to do with his race. See John Mollenkopf, A 
Phoenix in the Ashes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 219.
166 See Susan Howell, “Racial Polarization, Reaction to Urban Conditions, and the Approval of 
Black Mayors,” in Yvette M. Alex-Assensoh and Lawrence J. Hanks, eds. Black and Multiracial Politics 
in America (New York: New York University Press, 2000), pp. 60-83. In the case that Howell analyzes, 
polarization entails evaluations of black mayors that are sharply delineated by race regardless of  
performance while inoculation entails evaluations that are more or less harsh depending on racial  
identity. Inoculation means that black voters go easier than whites on black mayors, even if both agree 
that mayoral performance is substandard.
167 For race see William J. Keefe and Marc J. Hetherington, Parties, Politics, and Public Policy in 
America, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quesrterly Press, 2003), pp. 228-230. For ethnicity see 
Kim Geron, Latino Political Power (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005), pp. 104-105. According to the 
2006 Latino National Survey, while 45 percent of Latinos voted Democratic, only 36 percent considered 
themselves Democrats. See Luis R. Fraga, et al. Latino National Survey (LNS), 2006  [Computer File], 
ICPSR20862-v1. (Miami, FL: Geoscape International [producer], 2006. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2008-05-27), pp. 67, 69.
168 For Latinos see Rodolfo De La Garza, et al., Latino Voices: Mexican, Puerto Rican, And Cuban 
Perspectives On American Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 136, 138. In this survey, 
Puerto Ricans were more likely than Mexicans or Cubans to support a co-ethnic candidate if they 
had a choice. The 2006 Latino National Survey suggests that, while for 50 percent of Latinos ethnicity 
is very important as a criterion for candidate preference, 60 percent are willing to overlook ethnicity 
for the sake of issues. See Op. Cit, pp. 6-7, 75-76. In the case of Puerto Ricans, the campaigns of 
Badillo and Ferrer provide evidence in support of the proposition concerning ethnic preferences and 
there’s evidence from Hartford, Connecticut as well. See José E. Cruz, Identity and Power: Puerto 
Rican Politics and the Challenge of Ethnicity (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998). For African 
Americans see Marcus D. Pohlman, Black Politics in Conservative America, third edition (New York: 
Sloan Publishing, 2008), pp. 190, 210, n.28. The findings cited by Pohlman are for presidential elections.
than whites even though Ferrer’s position was an affront  
to blacks.
In sum, this historical account suggests that the path to mayoral 
power in New York City is open to all. The keen reader can 
rightfully say that this is not news. Recent studies support the 
contention that the urban political system is open.169 Perhaps 
the best confirmation that overall the political system is open 
and pluralistic can be found in the volume edited by Rodolfo 
Espino, David L. Leal, and Kenneth J. Meier, titled Latino Politics, 
Identity, Mobilization, and Representation (Charlottesville: University 
of Virginia Press, 2007). In this volume, the question of pluralism 
is not even addressed except for a remark by Rodney Hero in the 
Foreword that the status of Latinos in the political system shows 
“some signs of pluralism and inclusion, other evidence of relatively 
low status within a hierarchy and a minimal presence in certain 
institutions.” (p. xiv). The question of representation, for example, 
is examined in terms of process and substance but the possibility 
of representation is taken for granted. At the national level, the 
nomination of Barack Obama as the Democratic presidential 
candidate and his election in November, offers unequivocal 
evidence of accessibility. The cost of this particular opportunity 
was substantial but it was real and it produced results as well.
The study of New York City mayoral politics by Chris 
McNickle, cited throughout this paper, clearly shows that 
access to the mayoralty is pretty much open to all. McNickle 
concludes his analysis showing how blacks treaded that path 
successfully. He suggests that “the times [mid-1990s] do not 
yet favor a Hispanic candidate for mayor.”170 But why not, 
exactly? Puerto Ricans have yet to make it but this reflects 
their inability to match capability with feasibility rather than 
being the result of insurmountable structural obstacles or 
entrenched racism. To say that the system is open is not to 
reduce the process to cultural traits or agency factors, as some 
169 See Philip Kasinitz, John Mollenkopf, and Mary C. Waters, “Becoming American/Becoming 
New Yorkers: Immigrant Incorporation in a Majority Minority City,” International Migration Review 36:4 
(Winter 2002): 1020-1036; John Mollenkopf and John Logan, People and Politics in America’s Big 
Cities, (Drum Major Institute and Century Foundation, May 2003). “Becoming American…” notes 
the existence of social prejudice and discrimination while also observing that the response is often 
“increased effort and a sustained focus on success.” (p. 1030) The study also notes that “the struggle 
for minority empowerment has established new entry points into mainstream institutions and created 
many new minority-run institutions.” (p. 1032) The system is open but nothing is given away without 
struggle. Similarly, People and Politics… notes the existence of a representation gap between minori-
ties and their elected officials while suggesting that it is possible to close it over time.
170 McNickle, Op. Cit., p. 323.
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claim.171 The burden of proof is sometimes systemic and 
sometimes not. When Puerto Ricans had a good candidate the 
context was not favorable and when the context was favorable 
they did not have a good candidate; the lack of a good candidate 
magnified the impact of unfavorable contextual factors. When 
the party mattered most, their candidate was a reformer; when 
the party was over, their candidate was an organization man. 
This is what the mismatch between capability and feasibility is 
about. Puerto Rican ethnic identity is part of that equation 
and it has played contradictory roles, thrusting and energizing 
candidates as well as being the proverbial albatross around the 
candidate’s neck. It has been a source of support, a rationale 
for participation, and a proxy for substantive concerns—an 
element of capability. But it has also been a barrier to  
participation, an artificial boundary, and a rationale for  
prejudice and discrimination—an element of feasibility.
In the future, to be successful, Puerto Rican (Latino or  
minority) candidates should exhibit a moderate, conciliatory 
leadership style that is also principled. They must be firm 
enough to win respect and flexible enough to avoid acrimony 
and stalemate. In 1997, Ferrer behaved accordingly and Al 
Sharpton did not. After the primary and runoff election, Ruth 
Messinger was distracted by Sharpton’s continued challenge. 
His accusations of fraud created suspicion and discord among 
Democrats, especially blacks, and this contributed to 
Messinger’s loss to Giuliani. Weiner’s decision in 2005 to drop 
out, whether calculated or selfless, also evidenced a moderate 
and conciliatory disposition that was useful to Ferrer. It is easy 
to know this and not know the best way to behave in specific 
situations. How do we know when to be conciliatory as 
opposed to feisty? We may think we do know and still  
blunder. The important thing above all is to be pragmatic 
without appearing to lack conviction.
171 This is the view of José R. Sánchez in, “Puerto Rican Politics in New York: Beyond 
‘Secondhand’ Theory,” in Gabriel Haslip-Viera and Sherrie L. Baver, eds. Latinos in New York (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), pp. 259-301. One does not have to believe that culture 
is the only factor that affects participation to recognize that agency is still critical. A national survey of 
black Americans conducted in October and November 2007 revealed that while 82 percent of respon-
dents believed that prejudice was a reality in America, 60 percent agreed that “things are getting better 
for me.” More than half were positive about the future of blacks. Without that kind of attitude it makes 
no difference whether the system is open or not. See Charisse Jones, “Blacks in America Diverse and 
Optimistic,” Times Union, June 27, 2008, p. A4.  In the case of Latinos, some of the questions in the 
2006 Latino National Survey can be considered proxies for the measurement of openness. For exam-
ple, why would anyone naturalize if they felt that the political system offered no opportunities to them? 
Some Latinos do it for the benefits but 48 percent do it to be able to vote or to benefit from existing 
legal, political, and civil rights. See Fraga, et al. Latino National Survey (LNS), 2006…, p. 49.
A successful candidate will also be careful enough to avoid 
association with polarizing figures. This is extremely difficult 
because we cannot fully control the actions of others; but it is 
not impossible. Ferrer could not tell Sharpton to be quiet but 
he had no need to court him either. If a candidate is endorsed 
by an extremist, he can talk himself blue in the face dissociating 
himself from the endorser and the damage will still be  
irrevocable. Moreover, if rejecting an unpopular supporter 
means alienating an in- or out-group member, the risk of  
losing support from the in-group at-large is much greater. 
Sharpton’s support created such a dilemma for Ferrer and  
his campaign did not address it properly. When the in-  
or out-group in question is a numerical minority of the  
electorate, the consequences of alienating its members are  
not dire. But even in that case, the dilemma is real and  
significant, especially if it is not entirely clear whether the 
polarizing figure is such because of unpopular but legitimate 
views or because of racial, ethnic, or gender prejudice.
A variant of this challenge is the problem of in-group division 
and/or lack of support from akin out-groups. It is not reasonable 
to expect unanimous support for any given individual, but 
Puerto Rican (Latino or minority) candidates must aspire to 
maximum feasible support from co-ethnics. The easiest and 
often quite powerful way to dismiss a minority candidate (or 
any candidate, for that matter) is to point out that he/she is 
not fully supported by his/her own, e.g. Puerto Ricans not 
supporting Badillo or Ferrer (and in other examples, a son not 
supporting his father, a state not supporting a native son, a 
husband undermining his candidate wife, etc.). A group like 
the MPI, and its successor the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, 
would not have supported Badillo or Ferrer under any  
circumstances. But for MPI leaders to call Badillo a rotten 
leader in 1985 was more than just being unsupportive. 
Maximum feasible support from akin out-groups is also  
critical. Badillo fumed over Bella Abzug’s reversal of promise 
in 1977 but this was minor compared to the entrance of Percy 
Sutton in the race. Black support was critical to a Puerto 
Rican mayoral candidacy then and it will be so in the  
foreseeable future, just as Puerto Rican support was critical  
to David Dinkins in 1989 and Mark Green in 2001; the  
former had it and won, the latter didn’t and lost. Blacks 
(Puerto Ricans or Latinos) do not necessarily have to be the 
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predominant element within a coalition of akin out-group 
supporters, but they have to be included and the coalition 
must be sufficiently broad to make a difference. 
Instead of rejecting ideology and projecting pragmatism, it 
may be more important for Puerto Rican (Latino or minority) 
candidates to avoid running against an incumbent with a good 
record. Major campaign gaffes should not be the norm in 
their performance. As far as projections are concerned, a  
positive message emphasizing collective goods can go a  
long way in luring either the broadest aggregation of the  
electorate or the broadest electoral segment necessary to win. 
Candidacies based on radical normative platforms such as that 
of Jerónimo Domínguez are doomed to fail. In fact, in 2001 
there was a faint echo of Domínguez’s 1981 campaign against 
the rich in Ferrer’s “other New York” slogan which, however 
mild by comparison with Dominguez’s war cry, was perceived 
as racially divisive.172 Four years later, Ferrer was unable to 
allay the suspicion of many voters that his administration 
would favor only the “other” New Yorkers. Thus, a serious 
challenge facing Puerto Rican (Latino or minority) candidates 
in the future is figuring out how to avoid the so-called 
Dinkins trap. In 1993, Dinkins was unable “to appease the 
city’s influential white voters and business community while 
satisfying the black and Latino activists who formed his core 
support.” He secured the support of 60 percent of Latino  
voters but Giuliani finished the race with 70 percent of  
the more mobilized white vote. Dinkins lost the business  
community and therefore he lost the race.173 
Anthony Weiner’s sensible decision to withdraw from the race 
shortly after the September 2005 primary echoed Fernando 
Ferrer’s decision to let Ruth Messinger run in 1997. This is 
what the New York Times said concerning Ferrer’s exit: “If Mr. 
Ferrer did the sensible thing in withdrawing, however, it 
should also be said that in four months of campaigning he 
showed an impressive command of city government, a feel  
for its issues and a personable style. As a strong favorite for  
172 Dave Saltonstall, “Ferrer’s Camp Proud of Way it Ran the Race, Latinos and blacks in coalition,” 
Daily News, October 12, 2001, p. 22.
173 IPS-Inter Press Service, “United States: Republicans Boosted in Off-Year Elections,” November 
3, 1993. According to one news report Giuliani won 77 percent of the white vote. See Howard 
Goldberg, “Polls: Male Voters Help Woman Win in N.J., Democrats Defect to Giuliani,” The Associated 
Press, November 3, 1993.
re-election as Bronx Borough President, Mr. Ferrer still has  
an excellent future in city politics.”174 Unfortunately, doing the 
right thing in 1997 meant nothing for Ferrer’s prospects in 
2001 or 2005. Once it became clear that his qualifications 
were a mirage, he was done for.
Democratic prospects for 2009 looked better before October 
2008 when the New York City Council waived term-limits to 
allow Mayor Bloomberg to run for a third term. Projecting 
Bloomberg’s standing into the future, mayoral aspirants felt 
that the only way the mayor would be defeated in 2009 would 
be if a chance development brought him ill-repute with the voters. 
Some hoped that the public would hold onto its disapproval of 
the process whereby term-limits were suspended and punish 
Bloomberg by denying him re-election.  But discontent can be 
sustained only for so long and politics is contingent only to a 
certain extent. To win in the future, in addition to remembrance 
and luck, a Puerto Rican  (Latino or minority) candidate will 
need to have sufficient money to get his/her message across, 
an efficient campaign, a machine-like GOTV effort, and broad 
support across class, race, and ethnicity. Such a campaign will 
also have to be palatable to the corporate and professional 
world. Whomever the future Democratic contender may be, 
the worst thing the party could do is to choose a candidate at 
the end of a bitter internecine fight. As far as Puerto Ricans 
(Latinos or minorities) go, this account shows that they need 
to match capability with feasibility to be successful. The point 
is worth reiterating: Historically, when the Puerto Rican  
candidate has been good the context has not been favorable 
and when the context has been favorable the candidate has 
been inadequate. When the party mattered the most, their 
candidate was a reformer; when the party was over, their  
candidate was an organization man. Running a good  
candidate in a favorable context is what matching capability 
and feasibility is about.
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